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I. INTRODUCTION
The vast majority of business corporations are closely held,
with voting shares held by a single stockholder or a small group of
stockholders.1 These closely held business corporations often in-
volve relatively modest business enterprises and their stockhold-
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. A.B. 1961, Harvard College; J.D.
1968 University of Michigan.
1. H. HE.NN, LAW OF CORPORATONS § 257 (2d ed. 1970).
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ers are typically active in management of the business. 2 Although
the corporate form is usually adopted for tax advantages or to ob-
tain limited liability,3 it is not unusual for businesses to be incorpo-
rated merely because the principals feel that business should be
conducted in corporate form.4 Many close corporations are also
family corporations with all or a majority of the stock owned by
individuals related through birth or marriage.
Individuals investing in closely held corporations should be
concerned with the long range future of their investments and
their continuing rights to receive benefits from their investments
and to realize any appreciation in value. Family corporations are
subject to unique pressures in this regard. Family members often
have a strong desire to perpetuate family ownership and control
for future generations, and the direct interpersonal relationships
existing in family corporations intensify the pressures on manage-
ment, thus increasing the risk of control deadlock.
This paper discusses a variety of planning techniques applica-
ble to family control matters.5 Post mortem control efforts concern
two principal objectives: preservation of the business by providing
for payment of estate taxes without adversely affecting the busi-
ness or its ownership and transfer of control to successive genera-
tions. The techniques discussed focus primarily on transfers of
corporate control to younger family members and on discharge of
2. For example, in 1974 the Census Bureau repoited 1,965,894 active corpora-
tions of which 58% reported total assets of less than one hundred thousand
dollars and only 7% had total assets in excess of one million dollars. U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1977, at
560-61.
3. Possible tax advantages include lower corporate tax rates and corporate
fringe benefits such as qualified pension and profit sharing plans. An excel-
lent discussion of the tax advantages and disadvantages for a farm corpora-
tion is contained in Eastwood, The Farm Corporation From An Income Tax
Viewpoint: Friend or Foe?, 54 NEB. L. REv. 443 (1975). Limited liability may
be a major consideration in adopting the corporate form although the stock-
holders probably will remain liable for the financial risks of loss through
guarantees; moreover, good business judgement will require that risks of tort
liability be insured against.
4. See generally Hazen, The Decision to Incorporate, 58 NEB. L REV. 627 (1979).
5. This paper is neither a catalog of control devices nor an exhaustive analysis
of a particular device. Rather, the objective is to suggest a variety of tech-
niques which might be considered when estate or income tax planning in-
volves a family business corporation. The techniques also may be useful to
other business planning situations but their application in other planning
contexts is not discussed in this paper. When possible, the reader will be
referred to more extensive analyses of a particular technique although some
of the suggestions are relatively new or not well documented in the literature.
This is particularly true for Employee Stock Ownership Plans, see § V of text
infra; Roulette Buy-Sell Agreements, see § VI of text infra; and Independent
Board of Directors, see § VII of text infra.
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estate and income tax liabilities. As planning techniques they
should be considered well in advance of the events which give rise
to their need. Also discussed are two planning techniques (rou-
lette buy-sell agreements and an independent board of directors)
which address the problem of conflict and deadlock in family cor-
porate control.
II. INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAXES
The Internal Revenue Code provides two separate procedures
for the installment payment of federal estate taxes.6 A fifteen-year
installment election may be made under section 6166 and a ten-
year installment election may be made under section 6166A. Both
provisions are intended to ameliorate the impact of estate taxes on
the continuity of an active operating business.7 The specific harsh-
ness addressed by these provisions was the situation in which the
family of a decedent who had nearly all of his financial resources
committed to operating a business would be forced to dispose of
the business in order to discharge the unanticipated estate tax ob-
ligation.8 Under the installment payment provisions, it is possible
to use future income from the business to pay the estate taxes.
The alternative of using future income rather than proceeds from a
buy-sell agreement is made even more important by the carryover
basis provisions.9 Carryover basis would impose a penalty in the
6. LR.C. §§ 6166, 6166A. Section 6166A, formerly section 6166, was added to the
Internal Revenue Code by Pub. L. No. 85-866, tit. II, § 206(a), 72 Stat. 1681
(1958). The present section 6166 was added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, tit. XX, § 2004(a), 90 Stat. 1862.
7. See, e.g., JoiNT Comm. ON TAXATION, 94Tm CONG., 2D SEss., GENERAL EXPLANA-
TION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 543-51 (Comm. Print 1976), reprinted
in 1976-3 (vol. 2) C.B. 555-63.
8. The Committee explanation stated:
[Past] provisions have proved inadequate to deal with the liquid-
ity problems experienced by estates in which a substantial portion of
the assets consist of a closely held business or other illiquid assets.
In many cases, the executor was forced to sell a decedent's interest
in a farm or other closely held business in order to pay the estate tax.
This may have occurred even when the estate qualified for the 10-
year extension provided for closely held businesses. In these cases,
it may have taken several years before a business could regain suf-
ficient financial strength to generate enough cash to pay estate taxes
after the loss of one of its principal owners. Moreover, some busi-
nesses were not so profitable that they yielded enough to pay both
the estate tax and interest especially if the interest rate was high.
Id. at 546, 1976-3 (vol. 2) C.B. 558.
9. I.R.C. § 1023. The carryover basis provisions were enacted by the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, tit. XX, § 2005(a), 90 Stat. 1872, and were origi-
nally to take effect on January 1, 1977. However, the Revenue Act of 1978,
Pub. L No. 95-600, § 515, 92 Stat. 2884, postponed the effective date of the car-
ryover basis provisions until January 1, 1980, and it is possible that carryover
[Vol. 58:644
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form of an income tax upon cash withdrawn from a corporation in
exchange for stock pursuant to a buy-sell agreement which was
originally intended to provide the liquidity required to pay estate
taxes.
A. Fifteen-Year Installment Election
The fifteen-year installment election was added by the 1976 Tax
Reform Act.' 0 It provides an election to pay estate taxes in up to
ten annual installments, with the first installment due five years
after the date the estate tax would otherwise have been due." The
Code also provides an attractive annual interest rate of only four
percent on estate taxes attributable to the first $1,000,000 of value
of the closely held business portion of the estate.12
In order for the estate to qualify for the fifteen-year installment
election, in excess of sixty-five percent in value of the adjusted
gross estate must consist of a closely held business.' 3 The amount
of tax which may be postponed is limited to that portion of the to-
tal tax attributable to the closely held business portion of the ad-
justed gross estate.14 For example, if seventy-five percent of the
adjusted gross estate is comprised of a closely held business, sev-
enty-five percent of the estate tax may be paid in installments. For
purposes of determining whether the estate qualifies for the
fifteen-year installment payment election, the personal represen-
tative must value a farm or ranch estate under the alternative valu-
ation methods of section 2032A if that method was used in valuing
the property for the gross estate.15 In addition, the value of farm
basis will be repealed before the effective date. See, e.g., H.R. 13, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979).
10. Pub. L No. 94-455, tit. XX, § 2004(a), 90 Stat. 1862 (1976) (codified at I.R.C.
§ 6166).
11. I.R.C. § 6166(a).
12. I.R.C. § 6601(j) (2). See I.R.C. § 2001(c). The interest is paid annually during
the five-year deferral period and thereafter is paid as part of each annual in-
stallment. I.R.C. § 6166(f) (1)-(2). In addition, interest on deferred estate tax
obligations is deductible as an administration expense under LR.C.
§ 2053(a) (2). Estate of Charles A. Bahr, 68 T.C. 74 (1977); Rev. Rul. 78-125,
1978-1 C.B. 292, revoking Rev. Rul. 75-239, 1975-1 C.B. 304. The language in
revenue ruling 78-125 does not make it clear whether the entire projected
interest may be deducted from the gross estate or whether the estate must
file a refund claim with each annual interest payment.
13. I.R.C. § 6166 (a) (1). Interests in two or more closely held businesses may be
combined for purposes of meeting the 65% test if more than 20% of the value
of each business is included in the decedent's gross estate. I.R.C. § 6166(c).
14. I.R.C. § 6166(a) (2) provides: "The maximum amount of tax which may be
paid in installments under this subsection shall be an amount which bears
the same ratio to the tax ... as-(A) the closely held business amount, bears
to (B) the amount of the adjusted gross estate."
15. Although it might be advantageous to value the farm or ranch at its fair mar-
19791
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residential buildings regularly occupied by the owner, lessee or an
employee may be included in the value of the interest in a closely
held business. 16
In order to be eligible for the fifteen-year installment election,
the business must be an "active enterprise producing business in-
come rather than income solely from the ownership of property.' 7
Thus, in order for the estate of a farm landlord to qualify for the
election, the decedent must have materially participated in the
production of income from the farm property.18 For example, in
Revenue Ruling 75-36619 the Internal Revenue Service held that
farm real estate qualified for an extension of time to pay estate
taxes where the farm landlord received his rentals based upon
farm production rather than a fixed rental and where he partici-
pated in important decisions such as crop and field selection, gov-
ernment program participation, and weed control.20 However,
where the landlord's activities consist solely of managing commer-
ket value in order to meet the 65% of the estate test imposed by section
6166(a) (1), yet elect the special valuation method provided by section 2032A
in valuing the gross estate, such a dual valuation technique does not appear
possible under the Code. Section 6166(b) (4) provides that "[flor purposes of
this section, value shall be value determined for purposes of chapter 11 (re-
lating to estate tax)." Section 2032A(a)(1) provides that if the executor
makes the election therein provided, "then, for purposes of this chapter, the
value of qualified real property shall be its value for the use under which it
qualifies, under subsection (b), as qualified real property."
16. I.R.C. § 616.6(b) (3). The closely held business must be in the business of
farming and the buildings must be occupied by the owner or lessee or an
employee for purposes of operating or maintaining the farm. Id.
17. Rev. Rul. 75-365, 1975-2 C.B. 471. The revenue ruling interpreted the language
"trade or business" contained in I.R.C. § 6166(A) (c) (1) (formerly codified at
LR.C. § 6166(c) (1)). The present LR.C. § 6166(b) (1) contains the identical
"trade or business" language contained in its precedessor, and the Commit-
tee Explanation states that "[t]he Act generally retains the definition of ex-
isting law relating to an interest in a closely held business." JOnT COMM. ON
TAxATON, supra note 7, at 548, 1976-3 (vol. 2) C.B. 560.
18. The revenue ruling stated.
It follows that the mere grouping together of income-producing
assets from which a decedent obtained income only through owner-
ship of the property rather than from the conduct of a business, in
and of itself, does not amount to an interest in a closely held business
within the intent of the statute.
Rev. Rul. 75-965, 1975-2 C.B. 471.
19. Id. at 472.
20.
An individual is engaged in the business of farming if he culti-
vates, operates, or manages a farm for gain or profit, either as owner
or tenant, and if he receives a rental based upon farm production
rather than a fixed rental. Farming under these circumstances is a
productive enterpise which is like a manufacturing enterprise as dis-
tinguished from management of investment assets.
[Vol. 58:644
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cial and farm rental properties, the estate does not qualify for the
election.21 Since material participation is a critical element for the
farm landlord, the availability of the fifteen-year installment elec-
tion and its advisability should be considered when determining
which form the lease should take for Social Security purposes. If
the farmer landlord materially participates, it is likely that the
lease income will constitute earned income for purposes of Social
Security.22 Thus, it may be difficult for an estate to qualify for the
fifteen-year installment election if the farm owner has retired and
does not have a material participation lease in order not to incur
earned income that could offset Social Security payments.
After the fifteen-year installment payment election is made,
events may occur which will cause an acceleration of unpaid in-
stallments. A disposition of one-third or more in value or a with-
drawal of funds or assets representing one-third or more in value
of the decedent's interest in a closely held business will cause the
unpaid portion of the estate tax to become due upon notice and
demand.23 Also, as an administrative measure, the failure to pay
21. Id. at 471:
[T]he decedent maintained a fully equipped business office to collect
rental payments on the properties, receive payments on notes receiv-
able, negotiate leases, make occasional loans, and by contract direct
the maintenance of his properties. He maintained records and kept
regular office hours for collection of the amounts involved and the
maintenance of his properties.
In this case, the decedent's relationship to the various assets de-
scribed was merely that of an owner managing investment assets to
obtain the income ordinarily expected from them.
22. I.R.C. § 1402(a) defines earned income, or net earnings from self employment,
as "the gross income derived by an individual from any trade or business
carried on by such individual, less the deductions allowed by this subtitle
which are attributable to such trade or business. . . ." If net earnings from
self employment exceed the annual exempt amount provided under the So-
cial Security laws, an individual is no longer deemed "retired" and, accord-
ingly, Social Security benefits are reduced. 42 U.S.C.A. § 403(f) (West Supp.
1978). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.446 to .447 (1978). IR.C. § 1402(a) (1) provides that
earned income includes rental income earned through the "material partici-
pation by the owner.. . in the production or the management of the produc-
tion of such agricultural or horticultural commodities."
23. LR.C. § 6166(g) (1) (A). This provision does not apply to withdrawal of funds
in an IR.C. § 303 redemption if the redemption proceeds are applied against
the deferred-tax obligation either on the next installment date or within one
year of the redemption, whichever is earlier. However, the value of the inter-
est in the closely held business is reduced by the amount of the section 303
redemption, and this reduced value then becomes the basis for determining
whether subsequent dispositions or withdrawals constitute one-third or more
in value of the business. I.C. § 6166(g) (1) (B); Fleming, Funding Estate Tax
Installment Payments With Section 303 Redemptions After the 1976 Tax Re-
form Act, 4 J. CoRP. TAx. 22, 30-31 (1977).
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any installment on time results in acceleration of the tax due.2 4
B. Ten-Year Installment Election
The ten-year installment election has been in the Internal Rev-
enue Code since 1958.25 It was retained when the 1976 Tax Reform
Act adopted the fifteen-year installment election, since its eligibil-
ity terms are substantially easier for an estate to meet.26 In order
to be eligible for the ten-year installment election the estate must
include an interest in a closely held business which exceeds in
value either thirty-five percent of the value of the gross estate or
fifty percent of the value of the taxable estate.27 Again, the interest
must be in an active trade or business and the decedent must have
been the proprietor, partner or stockholder.28
Although the ten-year installment election has lower threshold
requirements than the fifteen-year installment election, it bears in-
terest at the rate imposed on all deferred tax payments and defi-
ciencies 29 rather than the favorable four percent rate provided by
the fifteen-year election for the closely held business portion of the
estate.3 0 The maximum amount of estate tax which may be de-
ferred by the ten-year installment election is a portion of the tax
which equals the ratio of the value of the closely held business to
the gross estate.31 This is in contrast to the fifteen-year install-
ment election where the ratio is computed with regard to the ad-
justed gross estate,32 thereby resulting in a more generous
deferral. In addition, under the ten-year installment election the
first payment is to be paid on or before the regular due date pre-
scribed for the payment of the estate tax, rather than the five year
24. I.R.C. § 6166(g) (3).
25. Pub. L. No. 85-866, tit. 1I, § 206(a), 72 Stat. 1681 (1958), amended, Pub. L. No.
93-625, § 7(d) (2) (3), 88 Stat. 2115 (1974).
26. Pub. L No. 94-455, tit. XX, § 2004(a), 90 Stat. 1834, 1862 (1976) (codified at
LR.C. § 6166A).
27. LR.C. § 6166A(a) (1)-(2). Interests in two or more closely held businesses
may be aggregated in order to meet the tests of section 6166A(a) (1)-(2), but
only if 50% or more of the total value of each business is included in the dece-
dent's gross estate. I.R.C. § 6166A(d).
28. I.R.C. § 6166A(c); Rev. Rul. 75-365, 1975-2 C.B. 471. See notes 17-22 & accompa-
nying text supra.
29. LR.C. § 6166A(g) provides that the interest is payable under I.R.C. § 6601.
That section provides that the rate of interest is the rate established under
I.R.C. § 6621. Pursuant to section 6621(b), the Service has established the
current annual rate of interest on tax obligations at six percent. Rev. Rul. 77-
411, 1977-2 C.B. 480, 481.
30. LR.C. § 6601(j).
31. LR.C. § 6166A(b).
32. LR.C. § 6166(a) (2).
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deferral of any payment provided by the fifteen-year election.3 3
Acceleration of unpaid installments is also required under the
ten-year installment election.34 However, under the ten-year in-
stallment method there must be an aggregate withdrawal or dispo-
sition of fifty percent or more in value of the business before
acceleration occurs, compared to the one-third or more in value
that causes acceleration under the fifteen-year installment elec-
tion.35
C. Integration of Estate Tax Payment Installment Elections With
Section 303 Stock Redemptions
Stock redemptions to pay death taxes which satisfy the require-
ments of section 303 have long been a favorite method of withdraw-
ing corporate funds.36 Prior to the the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
such corporate redemptions qualified as capital transactions in
which the stepped-up basis resulting from death eliminated in-
come taxes.37 Thus, an estate could extract corporate funds to pay
death taxes and funeral and administration expenses without in-
come tax consequences. In order to use section 303, the stock
value must exceed fifty percent of the value of the gross estate re-
duced by the deductions allowed for estate expenses, indebted-
33. I.R.C. § 6166A(e) (the first installment being due on the regular due date pre-
scribed by section 6151(a)); IR.C. § 6166(a) (3) (first installment shall be paid
on a date not more than five years after the date prescribed by section
6151(a)).
34. IR.C. § 6166A(h).
35. Under LR.C. § 6166(h) (1) (B), withdrawal of funds pursuant to a section 303
redemption does not accelerate payment if all the proceeds from the redemp-
tion are applied to the estate tax obligation on the date the next installment is
paid. To the extent the section 303 redemption reduces the value of the inter-
est in a closely held business, however, the basis for determining whether
subsequent withdrawals or dispositions constitute 50% or more in value of
the business is reduced. Fleming, supra note 23, at 30-31.
36. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 23; Huffaker, Redemption of Stock to Pay Estate
Taxes: Techniques of Pay-Out, 25 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 963 (1967); Kadish,
Section 303-Redemptions to Pay Death Taxes and Administrative Expenses:
A Relief Provision Liberally Construed, 18 W. REs. L. REV. 895 (1967); Tiger,
How to Plan Stock Redemptions to Pay Estate Taxes-The Problems of Sec-
tion 303, 24 J. TAx. 92 (1966). The statute providing "sale or exchange" treat-
ment for redemptions to pay death taxes was originally enacted in 1954. Act
of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 88 (codified at LRC. § 303).
37. Sections 303 and 1014 interacted to provide this result. Section 303 provided
that redemptions to pay death taxes would be taxed as payments in exchange
for the stock rather than as dividends under LR.C. § 301. Since I-R.C.
§ 1014(a) provided that the basis of the stock would be stepped-up to its fair
market value at the date of decedent's death, there was no gain requiring
payment of income taxes unless the stock appreciated in value between the
date of decedent's death and the date of the redemption.
1979]
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ness, and taxes.38 The redemption must be from the stockholder
who must actually pay or be obligated to pay the expenses. 39
The carryover basis provisions imposed by the Tax Reform Act
of 1976,40 if implemented, would reduce the desirability of section
303 redemptions, in that redemptions may result in income tax lia-
bility, albeit at capital gain rates.4 1 Moreover, the section 303 re-
demption at capital gain rates cannot be increased to provide
funds with which to pay the income tax liability.42
If the estate elects to pay its estate taxes on an installment ba-
sis it must consider the effect that a section 303 redemption might
have on the installment payment election. The first consideration
in integrating the redemption with the installment election is the
comparison of threshold requirements. 43 Unfortunately, section
303 was not designed to integrate with either installment election
provision so the eligibility requirements must be separately
tested.44 The percentage of stock ownership tests for the ten-year
installment election and section 303 redemption differ greatly and
it is possible that an estate could qualify under one but not the
other.45 However, the higher percentage requirement of the
38. LR.C. § 303(b) (2) (A). Stock from two or more corporations may be combined
for purposes of meeting the 50% test, but only if more than 75% in value of
the oustanding stock of each corporation is included in the decedent's gross
estate. I.R.C. § 303(b) (2) (B).
39. LR.C. § 303(b) (3). Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, stock qualified for a
section 303 redemption if it was included in the decedent's estate. It was un-
necessary that the proceeds be used to pay death taxes or administrative ex-
penses, or even that the stock be redeemed from the estate of the decedent.
Treas. Reg. § 1.303-(2)(f) (1960). See Kadish, supra note 36, at 898-99. The
Tax Reform Act of 1976 amended section 303 "to require that capital gains
treatment... will apply to the distribution by a corporation only to the ex-
tent that the interest of a shareholder is reduced either directly or through a
binding obligation to contribute toward the payment of debts, expenses, or
taxes." JOINT CoMm. ON TAxAION, supra note 7, at 551, 1976-3 (vol. 2) C.B.
563.
40. I.R.C. § 1023. The carryover basis provisions are currently scheduled to take
effect on January 1, 1980. See note 9 supra.
41. When the carryover basis provisions take effect, stock will no longer receive a
step up in basis to its fair market value at date of death, but will retain the
basis it had in the hands of the decedent, with a step up in basis to its value
on December 31, 1976. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 515, 92 Stat.
2884.
42. I.R.C. § 303(a) provides that redemption proceeds shall be treated as received
in exchange for stock only to the extent they do not exceed the amount of
death taxes and of funeral and administration expenses allowable as deduc-
tions.
43. For an exhaustive analysis of the interrelationship between section 303 and
sections 6166 and 6166A, see Fleming, supra note 23.
44. Fleming, supra note 23, at 24.
45. Stock qualifies for a section 303 redemption if it exceeds 50% of the adjusted
gross estate (LR.C. § 303(b) (2)), and for a section 6166A ten-year deferral if it
[Vol. 58:644
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fifteen-year election would also qualify a section 303 stock redemp-
tion.46 In addition, there are separate stock ownership rules appli-
cable to certain variations, such as when stock in two or more
businesses is involved.47
Obstacles to the joint use of a section 303 stock redemption and
an installment payment election are also presented by the timing
and acceleration provisions. Once four years from the date of the
decedent's death have elapsed, section 303 permits qualifying re-
demptions only to the extent they do not exceed the lesser of the
amount of death taxes and funeral and administration expenses
remaining unpaid on the date of the redemption or the amount of
death taxes and funeral and administration expenses which are
paid during the year beginning with the date of redemption. The
net effect of this provision is to limit redemptions after the expira-
tion of a four year period to the amount which will actually be ap-
plied to the unpaid balance of death taxes and expenses within
exceeds either 35% of the gross estate or 50% of the taxable estate (IR.C.
§ 6166A(a)). Thus, depending on the deductions to which a particular estate
is entitled, either section 303 or section 6166A could have the higher threshold
requirement See Fleming, supra note 23, at 26-28.
46. Stock qualifies for the section 6166 fifteen-year deferral if it exceeds 65% of
the adjusted gross estate (IMC. § 6166(a)). Since the test for section 303 is
50% of the adjusted gross estate, an estate qualifying under section 6166
should always qualify under section 303. See Fleming, supra note 23, at 24-26.
47. Under section 303(b) (2) (B), stock in two or more corporations may be aggre-
gated for purposes of meeting the 50% of the adjusted gross estate test, but
only if more than 75% in value of each corporation is included in the dece-
dent's gross estate. In order to meet the 65% of the adjusted gross estate test
imposed by section 6166, stock of two or more corporations may be aggre-
gated if more than 20% of the total value of each is included in the decedent's
gross estate. To meet the 35% of the gross estate or 50% of the taxable estate
tests under section 6166A, stock from two or more corporations may be aggre-
gated, but only if more than 50% of the total value of each is included in the
gross estate. Thus section 303 imposes a much higher threshold requirement
(75%) on the value of the stock in each corporation which must be included
in the gross estate before it may be aggregated than does either section
6166(20%) or section 6166A (50%).
48. I..C. § 303 provides that redemptions more than four years after the date of
decedent's death qualify
only if the redemption proceeds do not exceed the lesser of (1) the
decedent's then-unpaid death taxes, funeral expenses, and/or ad-
ministration expenses, or (2) the amount of the decedent's death
taxes, funeral expenses, and/or administration expenses paid within
one year after the redemption transaction. Since (2) will never be
greater than (1) in the preceeding sentence, the effect of this rule is
to require the proceeds of all redemptions occurring more than four
years after death to be applied against the decedent's death taxes,
funeral expenses, and/or administration expenses within one year
after the transaction.
Fleming, supra note 23, at 29.
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one year of the redemption.49 In addition, unless the estate applies
all the proceeds of the redemption against the balance of the estate
tax obligation within one year after the redemption, the with-
drawal may reduce the value of the business to the extent that
payment of the remaining installments is accelerated.50
HI. BUY-SELL PRICING AND PAYMENT TERMS
Buy-sell agreements are essential for a closely held corpora-
tion. They are commonly used to resolve control problems which
might occur on the death of one of the principals and are a means
of providing liquidity when a substantial portion of the gross estate
is invested in a closely held business. 5 1 Buy-sell agreements may
have the additional advantage of establishing stock value for estate
tax purposes.5 2 In a family corporation, the buy-sell may be the
contractual mechanism whereby younger generations are en-
couraged to work in the business and are rewarded for their efforts
with eventual ownership of the business on favorable terms.
Planning considerations for buy-sell agreements will be differ-
ent if the carryover basis provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976
are made permanent as of January 1, 1980.53 Under existing law,
stock held by a decedent in a closely held corporation receives a
stepped-up basis to its date-of-death value solely at the cost of es-
tate taxes imposed on the value.5 4 Thus, implementation of the
buy-sell agreement after death results in no income taxes unless
the value of the stock increases between the date of death and the
date the buy-sell is implemented. If carryover basis is permitted to
49. Id. n.44.
50. LR.C. §§ 6166(g) (1) (A), 6166A(h) (1). See notes 23 & 35 supra. The extreme
complexities of combining a section 303 redemption with the deferral provi-
sions of sections 6166 and 6166A are discussed at length in Fleming, supra
note 23, at 28-40.
51. The literature on buy-sell agreements is extensive. See, e.g., 2 F. O'NEAL,
CLOsE CoRoRA=ioNs ch. 8 (2d ed. 1971); Abrams, Tax Planning for Agree-
ments Disposing of a Shareholder's Closely Held Stock at Death, 57 GEo. W.
1211 (1969); Kahn, Mandatory Buy-Out Agreements for Stock of Closely Held
Corporations, 68 MICH. I REV. 1 (1969); Gorman, The Buy-Sell Agreement as
a Dispositionary Device: Tax and Valuation Problems in Transferring Corpo-
rate, Partnership and Real Estate Interests at Death, 34 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX.
1591 (1976); Nassau, Buy-Out Agreements in Planning the Estate of a Stock-
holder-Employee of a Closely Held Corporation, 31 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX.
1029 (1973).
52. See § 11-B-1 of text infra.
53. The Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 515, 92 Stat. 2884, extended the
effective date of the carryover basis provisions of LR.C. § 1023 to January 1,
1980. See note 9 supra.
54. I.R.C. § 1014 continues to provide a step up in basis to date of death fair mar-
ket value until January 1, 1980.
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go into effect,55 there would be no step up in basis and a significant
income tax liability may be incurred through implementation of a
buy-sell agreement.5 6 Imposition of both estate and income taxes
on stock received at death could result in a confiscatory levy which
would make implementation of a buy-sell agreement undesirable.
Arrangements for the transfer of stock within a family involve
considerations which may differ significantly from transfers among
unrelated parties. Family transfers are likely to be based on love
and affection together with a desire to have the family continue to
control and operate the business. The presence of these factors
encourages liberalization of price and payment terms. The plan-
ning technique discussed in this part explores the adoption of a
minimum price for buy-sell agreements and extended payment
terms which mesh with the estate's requirements.
A. Taxation of Buy-Sell Agreements
1. Redemptions or Entity Purchases
A buy-sell agreement involves a purchase of stock by either the
corporation, the remaining stockholders, or some combination of
the two.57 A redemption by the corporation must fit within certain
statutory exceptions5 8 to the general dividend rule59 for corporate
distributions in order to qualify as a sale or exchange. If it quali-
fies as a sale or exchange, the amount realized is reduced by the
stockholder's basis in his or her stock, and the gain is capital60 in
contrast to the ordinary income treatment accorded dividends.
The exceptions which would typically apply to a stock redemption
55. See note 9 supra.
56. Under LR.C. § 1023(h) (1) stock acquired before December 31, 1976, receives a
step up in basis to its fair market value on that date. Any appreciation in
value after that date will be taxed as gain to the beneficiary or the estate
when the stock is sold. The Revenue Act of 1978 did not alter the "fresh start"
date although it postponed the effective date of the carryover basis provisions
until January 1, 1980. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 515, 82 Stat. 2884.
57. A purchase of stock by the corporation is referred to as an entity purchase. A
purchase by the remaining stockholders is referred to as a cross purchase.
58. LR.C. § 302(b) (1)-(3). See text accompanying notes 61-63 infra.
59. I.R.C. § 301(c) provides ordinary income treatment for distributions with re-
spect to stock to the extent of the corporation's accumulated and current
earnings and profits.
60. IL.C. §§ 1202, 1221. The holding period requirements of § 1223 must, of
course, be met in order for the redemption to qualify for capital gain treat-
ment. Under section 1223(11), property which receives a step up in basis to
fair market value at date of death is considered to meet the holding period
requirements even if it is disposed of within one year after decedent's death.
When the carryover basis provisions of section 1023 take effect, the dece-
dent's holding period will be tacked onto that of the estate or the beneficiary.
I.R.C. § 1223(2).
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are contained in sections 302 and 303 of the Internal Revenue Code.
A distribution will be treated as payment in exchange for stock if
one of the exceptions provided in section 302 is met: (1) the re-
demption is "not essentially equivalent to a dividend,"6 1 (2) the
redemption is "substantially disproportionate, ' 62 or (3) the re-
demption is of all of the stock of the corporation owned by the
stockholder.63 .
The Code and the regulations do not specify when a redemption
is "not essentially equivalent to a dividend." Rather, the determi-
nation is based on all the facts and circumstances of the particular
transaction.6 As a general rule, pro rata redemptions are subject
to dividend treatment.65 Unfortunately, this means that redemp-
61. I.R.C. § 302(b) (1).
62. I.R.C. § 302(b) (2).
63. I.R.C. § 302(b) (3).
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1960). The legislative history of section 302(b) (1)
supports the factual nature of the inquiry. One of the proposals for the 1954
Code was to allow exchange treatment only for certain easily tested catego-
ries. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., § 302(a), reprinted in [1954] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 4017, 4209-14. The Senate rejected this mechanical
approach in favor of the more flexible factual inquiry. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 42,233 (1954). However, in United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301
(1970), the Supreme Court eliminated a bona fide business purpose for the
redemption as a relevant factor.. Id. at 312. In addition, the Court ruled that
the attribution rules of section 318 are applicable to section 302(b)(1) re-
demptions and the redemption "must result in a meaningful reduction of the
shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation" in order to be taxed
as an exchange instead of as a dividend. Id. at 313. Query whether a mean-
ingful reduction occurs where the ownership percentage change is significant
but the stockholder still has an absolute majority of the stock or actual work-
ing control. See Rev. Rul. 78-401, 1978-46 I.R.B. at 5, holding that a reduction
from 90% to 60% is not a "meaningful reduction." The dissenting opinion in
Davis maintained that the majority opinion mandated, in effect, that a re-
demption of stock in a closely held corporation is always equivalent to a divi-
dend. 397 U.S. at 314. This would appear to be true in the case of a family
corporation where as a result of the attribution rules of section 318 each fam-
ily member is deemed to own all of the outstanding stock regardless of any
redemption.
Davis stimulated additional comment on the nature of the test in a case
which involved capital contributed to a closely held corporation for a specific
purpose and a limited number of years. Nonvoting, nondividend paying pre-
ferred stock was issued which was redeemable within 10 years. The tax
court held that the liquidating distributions were equivalent to dividends be-
cause the redemption did not change the relative economic interests of the
parties. Miele v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 556 (1971), acq., 1972-1 C.B. 2, affd per
curiam, 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Albers v. Commissioner,
414 U.S. 982 (1973). In a written dissent to the denial of certiorari, three Jus-
tices (Powell, Blackmun and Douglas) argued that a factual inquiry would
have lead to a different result, 414 U.S. at 986, and warned that the Davis rule
falls most heavily on small family corporations lacking specialized tax coun-
sel. 414 U.S. at 988 n.8.
65. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 307 (1970)...
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tions involving family corporations probably will not qualify for the
"not essentially equivalent to a dividend" exception because the
constructive ownership rules of section 318 apply.66 The Supreme
Court has held that where a stockholder constructively owning 100
percent of a family corporation causes part of the shares to be re-
deemed, the redemption is essentially equivalent to a dividend be-
cause the stockholder constructively continues to own 100 percent
of the corporation.6 7 Under the family attribution rules of section
318 an individual is considered to own stock owned by or for his or
her spouse, children, grandchildren and parents. 68 There is no at-
tribution from grandparents nor between brothers and sisters.69
Attribution is also effected from partnerships, estates, trusts and
corporations. 70
If constructive ownership rules do not preclude use of the "not
essentially equivalent to a dividend" exception, the redemption
may qualify for capital gain treatment even though the resulting
non-pro rata redemption does not meet the substantially dispro-
portionate requirements of section 302(b) (2). The Service, for ex-
ample, has ruled that a redemption which reduces a stockholder's
interest to exactly fifty percent when the other fifty percent is held
by an unrelated stockholder is not essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend.7 ' The ruling focuses on the fact that the redeemed stock-
66. I.R.C. § 318. See also note 64 supra.
67. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
68. I.R.C. § 318(a) (1) (A). Application of the family attribution rules when hostil-
ity exists among parties between whom stock involved in ownership has been
attributed has been frequently litigated. Perry S. Lewis, 47 T.C. 129 (1966);
Estate of Arthur H. Squier, 35 T.C. 950 (1961), acq., 1961-2 C.B. 5. After the
decision in Davis the courts continued to be troubled by the application of
family attribution rules when the relationship of the parties was inconsistent
with the attribution. In Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir.
1975), the court interpreted the "meaningful reduction" language of Davis to
require a factual inquiry and rejected a mechanical application of the attribu-
tion rules. 510 F.2d at 48. See generally Note, Family Hostility as Mitigating
The Constructive Ownership Rules of Section 318 When Applied to the Divi-
dend Equivalency Provision of Section 302(b) (1), 55 B.U. L REV. 667 (1975).
69. I.R.C. § 318(a) (1) (A). Compare with the attribution rules of section 267
which include brothers and sisters. I.R.C. § 267(c) (4).
70. I.R.C. § 318(a) (2). For example, corporate stock owned by a partnership is
considered to be owned proportionately by the partners. I.R.C.
§ 318(a) (2) (A). Similar flow through rules are applicable for estates and
trusts. LR.C. § 318(a) (2) (A)-(B). A proportionate amount of stock held by a
corporation, however, is only attributed to persons owning 50% or more in
value of the corporation. I.R.C. § 318(a) (2) (C).
71. Rev. Rul. 75-502, 1975-2 C.B. 111. The redemption could not qualify under sec-
tion 302(b) (2) (substantially disproportionate redemptions) because the
stockholder did not own less than 50% of the outstanding stock after the re-
demption was completed.
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holder gave up "dominant voting rights. ' 72 The Service has also
ruled that a substantial reduction in voting ownership may be
treated as a sale of stock under the "not essentially equivalent to a
dividend" exception even though the reduction was not enough to
satisfy the substantially disproportionate test of section
302(b) (2).73 However, in another ruling the Service has indicated
that in addition to the substantial decrease in ownership there
must be additional control factors which suggest that there has
been a meaningful reduction in the redeemed stockholder's pro-
portionate interest in the corporation.74
Similarly, substantially disproportionate reductions under sec-
tion 302(b) (2) are difficult to achieve within a family corporation
because the constructive ownership rules of section 318 attribute
to the stockholder stock held by other family members.7 5 Thus, in
a family corporation it is unlikely that after the redemption the
stockholder will own less than fifty percent of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote unless control is
held by a grandparent or brother or sister from whom there is no
attribution.76
The third exception to dividehd treatment is a complete re-
demption of all of a stockholder's interest.7 7 This exception is un-
72. Id.
73. Rev. Rul. 75-512, 1975-2 C.B. 112. The ruling deals with a reduction from 30%
to 24.3%, which is only a 19% reduction for purposes of the substantially dis-
proportionate test of section 302(b) (2).
74. Rev. Rul. 76-364, 1976-2 C.B. 91 held that a meaningful reduction had occurred
since the redeemed stockholder no longer could combine with only one other
stockholder for absolute numerical control. The stockholder had barely
missed satisfying the substantially disproportionate test of section 302(b) (2).
The Service's reliance on actual control suggests that in order to constitute a
meaningful reduction under section 302(b) (1) there must be an additional
factor other than a large percentage reduction.
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-3(a) (1960). Although the family attribution rules may be
avoided between hostile family members for purposes of the section
302(b) (1) "not equivalent to a dividend" redemption (see note 68 supra) and
may be waived for purposes of a section 302(b) (3) "complete termination of
interest" (see notes 79-83 & accompanying text infra), they may not be
avoided for purposes of a substantially disproportionate redemption.
76. I.R.C. § 318(a) (1). If a corporation is owned by brothers and sisters, a sub-
stantially disproportionate redemption may be possible if one or more of
them have stock redeemed. However, where stock ownership is concentrated
in a nuclear family unit consisting of first, second and third generation
(grandparents, parents and children) the attribution rules are likely to cause
a proposed redemption to fail the substantially disproprotionate test. Thus, if
either the grandparents or parents have some stock redeemed, there will be
full attribution under section 318(a) (1). However, if the children have some
of their stock redeemed, their grandparent's stock will not be attributed to
them.
77. LIC. § 302(b) (3).
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doubtedly the most widely used by family corporations.7 8 Under
this exception, the redemption qualifies as a sale or exchange as
long as all of the stockholder's stock in the corporation is re-
deemed. When a complete termination of a stockholder's interest
is involved, the family attribution rules7 9 do not apply if certain
tests are met: (1) immediately after the distribution the taxpayer
must not have any interest in the corporation except that of a cred-
itor;8 0 (2) the taxpayer must not acquire any interest in the corpo-
ration, other than by bequest or inheritance, for ten years after the
redemption;81 (3) the taxpayer must agree to notify the Service of
any acquisition of an interest within ten years from the date of the
78. This is due to the difficulty in satisfying the technical requirements of the
other alternative redemption plans (see text accompanying notes 64-76
supra) and the possible waiver of family attribution rules which makes a
complete termination feasible.
79. I.R.C. § 318(a) (1).
80. I.R.C. § 302(c) (2) (A) (i). This requirement constitutes a trap for the stock-
holder unwilling to sever all connections with the corporation other than as a
creditor. The Service will challenge the waiver if the stockholder continues
as an officer, director or employee. See Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521
(2d Cir. 1967); Rev. Rul. 56-556, 1956-2 C.B. 177. The redeemed stockholder
cannot even serve as an unpaid consultant. Rev. Rul. 70-104, 1970-1 C.B. 66;
Rev. Rul. 56-556, 1956-2 C.B. 177. The Service has also ruled that a stockholder
cannot have an attorney elected to the board of directors although the attor-
ney may attend board meetings. Rev. Rul. 59-119, 1959-1 C.B. 68. The stock-
holder may, however, render future services to the corporation as an
independent contractor. Estate of Lennard, 61 T.C. 554 (1974), acq. in result
only, 1974-2 C.B. 3.
The stockholder's status as a creditor must be bona fide. The regulations
limit creditor status as follows:
[A] person will be considered to be a creditor only if the rights of
such person with respect to the corporation are not greater or
broader in scope than necessary for the enforcement of his claim.
Such claim must not in any sense be proprietary and must not be
subordinate to the claims of general creditors. An obligation in the
form of a debt may thus constitute a proprietary interest. For exam-
ple, if under the terms of the instrument the corporation may dis-
charge the principal amount of its obligation to a person by
payments, the amount or certainty of which are dependent upon the
earnings of the corporation, such a person is not a creditor of the cor-
poration. Furthermore, if under the terms of the instrument the rate
of purported interest is dependent upon earnings, the holder of such
instrument may not, in some cases, be a creditor.
Treas. Reg. § 1.302-4(d) (1960). It is possible that if the purported debt is
deemed to constitute equity the transaction may be considered by the Serv-
ice under the recapitalization rules (sections 354 and 356) rather than the
stock redemption rules of section 302.
81. I.R.C. § 302(c) (2) (A) (ii). The limitation also applies to the acquisition of an
interest in a successor corporation. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-4(c) (1960). A creditor
may enforce a security interest in assets without violating the prohibition
against subsequent acquisition of an interest in the corporation but may not
acquire stock of the corporation albeit in a creditor status. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-
4(e) (1960).
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redemption;82 (4) the stock redeemed must not have been ac-
quired within ten years before the redemption from a person
whose stock ownership would be attributed to the taxpayer;8 3 and
(5) the taxpayer must not have transferred stock within ten years
before the redemption to another taxpayer whose stock would be
attributable to the redeemed taxpayer unless it was also re-
deemed.84 However, the latter two tests do not apply if the tax-
payer can show that the stock transfers were not for the principal
purpose of avoiding federal income tax.85
As noted earlier, the constructive ownership rules of section 318
attribute ownership from partnerships, estates, trusts and corpora-
tions as well as between family members.86 These constructive
ownership provisions are not waived under section 302(b) (3) since
the complete termination of interest waiver applies solely to the
constructive ownership of stock through family relationships. 87
This can create a difficult problem for post mortem implementa-
tion of family buy-sell agreements. If at the time of the redemption
any of the stock is held by a trust or estate, there is a significant
risk that the redemption will be taxed as a dividend distribution.88
For example, if the estate is the redeemed stockholder, it will be
considered to own any stock which is owned by its beneficiaries
and any stock which its beneficiaries may be deemed to own under
the attribution rules. In a family corporation such attribution
probably would mean that there has been neither a complete ter-
mination of interest nor a substantially disproportionate distribu-
tion. Rather, it is likely that the estate would be deemed to own
100 percent of the voting stock both before and after the redemp-
tion.
The Service's insistence upon a literal application of the statu-
82. LR.C. § 302(c) (2) (A); Treas. Reg. § 1.302-4(a) (1960), amended, T.D. 7535, 1978-
1 C.B. 84. The periods of limitations on assessments and collection are ex-
tended to include the period preceding such an acquisition and one year
thereafter. LR.C. § 302(c) (2) (A).
83. LR.C. § 302(c) (2) (B) (i).
84. LR.C. § 302(c) (2) (B) (ii).
85. I.R.C. § 302(c) (2) (B). Tax avoidance would occur, for example, where the
stockholder transfers stock to a spouse with a contemplated redemption of
either the transferor's remaining stock or the gifted stock held by the spouse.
On the other hand, gifts of stock to children employed in the business in or-
der to enable them to exercise control over the corporation will not be consid-
ered in avoidance of federal income taxes. Rev. Rul. 77-293, 1977-2 C.B. 91.
86. See note 70 supra.
87. Section 302(c) (1) requires the application in stock redemptions of all the at-
tribution rules of section 318(a) whereas section 302(c) (2) provides that sec-
tion 318(a) (1) (the family attribution rules) shall not apply in certain
circumstances to a complete termination of interest under section 302(b) (3).
88. Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2 C.B. 106; Rev. Rul. 68-388, 1968-2 C.B. 122; Rev. Rul. 72-
472, 1972-2 C.B. 202.
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tory language can lead to nonsensical results. For example, a sur-
viving spouse could receive capital gain treatment on stock owned
in her own right and dividend treatment with respect to stock re-
deemed from the estate.89 In the two cases which have litigated
the literal application of the statutory language, the courts have
held that an estate may make the necessary agreement to waive
the family attribution rule.90 The Service, however, has not acqui-
esced in these decisions and apparently will continue to litigate
any attempted extensions of the waiver of family attribution rules.
The problem may be avoided by having the estate distribute the
stock to the beneficiary prior to the redemption. This would re-
move the estate from stock ownership and eliminate the estate at-
tribution rules,91 but the distribution may carry out distributable
net income to a high bracket taxpayer.92 There may, in addition,
be practical limitations on early estate distributions and distribu-
tions to trusts would merely raise the trust attribution rules.9 3
Finally, section 303 accords sale or exchange treatment to the
redemption of some of a decedent's stock even though the redemp-
tion does not qualify under the exceptions of section 302.94 In or-
der to qualify, the federal estate tax value of the decedent's stock
in the redeeming corporation must exceed fifty percent of the de-
cedent's adjusted gross estate.95 The purpose of section 303 is to
permit favorable tax treatment on stock redemptions to the extent
necessary to pay death taxes and funeral and administrative ex-
penses. 96 Thus, the party whose shares are redeemed must actu-
ally bear the burden of estate taxes and expenses, and any stock
redemption in excess of the amount allowed by section 303 will be
treated as an ordinary dividend unless the exceptions of section
302 apply.
2. Cross Purchase Agreements
The complexities of a stock redemption are avoided where the
89. Lillian M. Crawford, 59 T.C. 830 (1973), nonacq., 1974-2 C.B. 5.
90. Rickey v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. La. 1976); Lillian M. Crawford,
59 T.C. 830 (1973), nonacq., 1974-2 C.B. 5. While these cases arrive at reason-
able results the Service's concern is understandable since the estate's waiver
does not prevent beneficiaries from subsequently acquiring an interest in the
corporation.
91. Another example of post mortem estate planning exists where an estate is
concerned about attribution from a beneficiary. It may be possible to com-
plete estate distributions to the beneficiary in order to terminate the person's
beneficiary status.
92. I.R.C. § 662(a).
93. LR.C. § 318(a) (2) (B).
94. LR.C. § 303.
95. LR.C. § 303(b) (2) (A). See note 38 supra.
96. See notes 36-50 supra.
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purchase is made by surviving stockholders. Sale of stock may be
made by the estate, a trust, or beneficiaries without resulting in
ordinary gain.9 7 Cross purchase agreements, however, have not
been widely used.98 If the buy-sell agreement is funded by insur-
ance, a cross purchase agreement requires a complex arrangement
of insurance policies which must be owned individually rather
than by the corporation.9 9 This can result in unfairness when
younger stockholders must pay higher premiums on the lives of
older stockholders. If the purchase is not funded by life insurance,
the surviving stockholders typically must look to the corporation
for funds with which to make the purchase. This can create addi-
tional tax and cash flow burdens. Cross purchase agreements,
however, will become significantly more popular if the carryover
basis rules are adopted.'O° In a cross purchase the surviving stock-
holder receives a basis in the acquired stock equal to its purchase
price, thereby reducing income tax on the purchaser's eventual
sale of the stock. Under existing laws this advantage has had mini-
mal value in family corporations since the purchasing stock-
holder's stock has often been held until death, at which time a free
step up in basis has occurred.1 1
B. Minimum Pricing
For a family corporation, minimum pricing of buy-sell agree-
ments should be considered along with other traditional tech-
niques of transferring ownership to family members. Minimum
pricing may reduce both estate and income taxes resulting from
the death of a family member. 0 2 It is highly desirable to establish
a price or a method for determining a price prior to the events giv-
ing rise to the right or obligation to purchase. Failure to establish a
price, either in a fixed amount or by formula, may cause the entire
agreement to fail for lack of an essential term. 0 3 A predetermined
97. LR.C. § 1001. Sales to individuals as opposed to the corporation are not re-
stricted by the stock redemption requirements of section 302. However,
losses between related individuals may be disallowed. I.R.C. § 267.
98. Entity purchase agreements are much simpler in operation and stockholders
typically prefer to use corporate funds for the purchase. The complexity of
cross purchase agreements is due primarily to the multiple number of deci-
sions to purchase which must be made.
99. For example, an entity agreement in a five person corporation would require
that the corporation own five insurance policies, one on each stockholder.
However, for a cross purchase agreement each stockholder typically would
have four policies, one on each of the other stockholders, for a total of twenty
insurance policies.
100. See note 9 supra.
101. I.R.C. § 1014.
102. See §§ II-B-1 to -2 of text infra.
103. See generally 1 A. CoRBnN, CoNTRAcTs § 95 (1963); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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price also assures that personal or business considerations will not
preclude an agreement on price when the sale is consummated.
There are four basic valuation methods for establishing a price
for corporate stock: (1) book value, (2) agreed upon value, (3) ap-
praised value, and (4) capitalization of earnings.104 Often several
valuation methods are combined. For example, the parties may
wish to agree annually on the value to be used for the buy-sell
agreement but also provide that one of the other methods is to be
used in the event of a failure to agree on a value.
Which of these pricing methods should be used in order to es-
tablish a minimum price? The appraisal method probably would
be unsatisfactory when the parties are attempting to limit value
increases. If the appraisal method is adopted, the buy-sell agree-
ment might establish standards to guide the appraiser in deter-
mining an acceptable value. For example, inventories could be
valued at cost as opposed to market value and goodwill could be
ignored.10 5
The capitalization of earnings method often results in higher
valuations than the other methods. This is because the emphasis
on earning power takes into account goodwill and other in-
tangibles associated witithe business. The product of the capitali-
zation of earnings method, however, is dependent upon the period
over which earnings are considered and the capitalization rate ap-
plied to those average earnings. 10 6 If the capitalization of earnings
method is used the agreement should specify the representative
CONRACTS § 32(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1-7, 1973). See also Gradwohl, Historical
Perspectives on Nebraska Law Concerning Arbitration Agreements, 58 Neb.
L. Rev. 801 (1979) (discussion of limitations on agreements to arbitrate con-
tractual provisions).
104. See generally 2 F. O'NE.A, supra note 51, at 83-100; H. WEINSTOCK, PLANNING
AN ESTATE ch. 12 (1977); Bosland, Tax Valuation by Compromise, 19 TAX. L.
REV. 77 (1963); Rustigan, Lentz & Olson, Problens in Valuing Stock of a Close
Corporation: A Panel Discussion, 23 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAx. 1261 (1965). Rev.
Rul. 59-60, 1959-C.B. 237, sets forth eight factors to be considered in valuing a
closely held business. Included are (1) the nature of the business, (2) eco-
nomic outlook, (3) book value, (4) earning capacity, (5) dividend capacity, (6)
goodwill, (7) any recent sales and (8) comparable sales. See also Rev. Rul.
77-287, 1977-2 C.B. 319.
105. Donald, Corporate Buy-Out Agreements, 106-4th TAX MNGM'T (BNA) A-9.
106. A typical base period would be the five years preceeding the year of sale al-
though adjustments may be made to anticipate future increases or decreases
in earnings or to eliminate years with unusual earnings. A. DEWING, FINAN-
CIAL POLICY OF CORPORAnONS ch. 10 (5th ed. 1953),contains the traditional
starting point for determining capitalization rates. Dewing establishes seven
descriptive categories with different capitalization rates. However, the Dew-
ing rates have been characterized as outdated. D. HERWrrZ, BusmEss PLAN-
NING 18 (1966). See also Krahmer & Henderer, Valuation of Shares of Closely
Held Corporations, 221 TAx MNGM'T (BNA).
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earnings period and the capitalization rate. This alone, however,
will not prevent future increases in value since the base period and
its earnings will presumably change over time and could increase
substantially, thereby increasing the resulting value determined
under this method.
An agreed upon value obviously would establish a minimum
price with certainty and simplicity. If the parties do so agree, they
may wish to provide for periodic revaluations. 107 If they are unable
to agree upon subsequent valuations, the agreement should pro-
vide for a substitute formula method or a regression to a previous-
ly agreed value.
Valuation according to book value has been properly criticized
in the literature.10 8 Book value does not take into account the ap-
preciation in value of tangible assets or the value of intangible as-
sets such as goodwill and secret processes. 10 9 However, it is for
this very reason that book value probably is the best valuation
method when the parties wish to establish a minimum price for
their stock. Book value is precise and simple and is probably the
most frequently used method for establishing stock prices in buy-
sell agreements. 110 The value established is consistent with the
books and records of the corporation, thereby providing a certain
appealing symmetry to both the stockholders and the Internal
Revenue Service. Although valuation according to book value gen-
erally results in a relatively modest value for the corporation, there
is no requirement that the value be determined as 100 percent of
book value, and the parties may wish to fix stock value in terms of
a percentage of book value. Percent of book value formulas bear a
similarity to minority interest discounts allowed by the Service in
valuing stock of closely held corporations for estate tax pur-
poses."'
1. Fixing Estate Tax Values
There are two basic requirements in order for a minimum price
in a buy-sell agreement to establish the estate tax value at an
amount lower than the actual fair market value of the stock. First,
the buy-sell agreement must absolutely restrict the stockholder's
107. Annual valuations are standard. The buy-sell agreement should include an
appendix for annual valuation which should be signed annually by all stock-
holders.
108. See, e.g., Krahmer & Henderer, supra note 106, at A-43.
109. Id.
110. Donald, supra note 105, at A-7.
111. See generally Dant, Courts Increasing Amount of Discount For A Minority
Interest in a Business, 43 J. TAx. 104 (1975); Feld, The Implication of Minority
Interest and Stock Restrictions in Valuing Closely-Held Shares, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 934 (1974).
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market for his or her stock.112 This means that the agreement
must constitute a completed contract, with the price either fixed or
determinable and the estate required to sell at that price. 113 In ad-
dition to the estate's obligation to sell at the contract price, the
agreement must also restrict the stockholder's ability to dispose of
the stock during his or her lifetime. 14 Second, the agreement
must represent a bona fide business arrangement as opposed to a
device to pass the decedent's shares to family members for less
than full consideration."15
The market limitation requirement is strictly enforced by the
Service. Thus, the buy-sell agreement must be specific and com-
plete and must not contain any method whereby the stockholder
may avoid the limitations of the agreement. In order to control
value the agreement must restrict lifetime transfers as well as
post mortem transfers. 1 6 Otherwise, the value of the stock would
be its full fair market value since the decedent could have realized
that amount by making a lifetime transfer. An example of the ne-
cessity for a complete restriction on transfer is contained in Ma-
thews v. United States,117 which involved a family corporation. A
stockholder agreement prohibited the transfer or assignment of
stock to anyone except lineal descendants, i.e., children and
grandchildren, without first giving other stockholders a right to
buy the stock at book value. The court held that the restriction
was not effective to establish estate tax values because the stock-
holder could have sold his stock to his descendants at other than
book value without first offering it to other stockholders. 1 8 Value
may be controlled by setting an option price rather than a
mandatory purchase price."19
Minimum pricing arrangements place special pressure upon
112. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1960).
113. United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962).
See Kahn, supra note 51.
114. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958). See Estate of Robert R. Gannon, 21 T.C.
1073, 1080 (1954). The form of the restriction should not matter. Thus, for
example, the agreement may provide for a prohibition on transfer, a right of
first refusal, or a mandatory purchase. See Brodrick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892
(10th Cir. 1955). In addition, if the restriction on sale is not apparent from the
buy-sell agreement, the court may look to other contractual relationships of
the parties to determine whether a decedent was prohibited from disposing
of the stock. See Estate of Lionel Weil, 22 T.C. 1267 (1954), acq., 1955-2 C.B. 10.
115. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958).
116. Id.
117. 226 F. Supp. 1003 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
118. Id. at 1008. Although the agreement did not establish estate tax values, the
court did consider the restriction on sale in determining the value of the
stock. See also Estate of James H. Matthews, 3 T.C. 525 (1944), acq., 1944 C.B.
19.
119. Rev. Rul. 54-76, 1954-1 C.B. 194.
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the requirement in the regulations that "the agreement represents
a bona fide business arrangement and not a device to pass the de-
cedent's shares to the natural objects of his bounty for less than an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.' 120
Minimum pricing buy-sell agreements among family members in-
evitably raise the question of whether the agreement served a
valid business purpose or was tax avoidance motivated.121 A prin-
cipal argument is that the buy-sell agreement is necessary to in-
sure the continuity of the family business. 122 It is often necessary
to induce younger family members into the business and a cer-
tainty of future ownership control at a favorable price provides ex-
cellent motivation for younger family members while they are
basically mere employees. These arguments are difficult to main-
tain, however, if the agreement is entered into when the principal
stockholder is elderly or in failing health. 23 In addition to busi-
ness management considerations, the courts have emphasized that
complete reciprocity constitutes adequate and full considera-
tion.1 2 4 This occurs where the agreement is equally binding on all
stockholders so that if the younger stockholder should die first, the
agreement is applicable to his or her estate.
Some commentators have interpreted the regulations to re-
quire that the purchase price established in the buy-sell agree-
ment must be reasonable. 2 5 Although the regulations do not
specifically mandate a reasonableness standard, one may be in-
ferred by the contrast in the regulations between a bona fide busi-
ness arrangement and a device to pass stock to family members for
less than full consideration. 126 Thus construed, any reasonable-
ness standard presumably does not compare the buy-sell price
with the fair market value of the stock. Rather, the price must be
reasonable in terms of the business goals sought to be attained and
the reciprocal nature of the agreement. 2 7 Nonetheless, a mini-
mum price which could be considered nominal under the circum-
stances probably would be considered by the Service to be a
bequest rather than a bona fide business arranagement. 128 Since
120. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958).
121. Slocum v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
122. Estate of Orville B. Littick, 31 T.C. 181 (1958), acq., 1959-2 C.B. 5.
123. Slocum v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). But see Estate of
Orville B. Littick, 31 T.C. 181 (1958), acq., 1959-2 C.B. 5.
124. Brodrick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955); Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 682
(2d Cir. 1932).
125. See Kahn, supra note 51, at 6; Polasky, Planning For The Disposition of a
Substantial Interest in a Closely Held Business (Part MT), 46 IowA L. Rav. 516,
567-69 (1961).
126. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958).
127. See notes 121-24 supra.
128. But see May v. McGowan, 194 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1952) (upholding a valuation
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the determination of a bona fide business arrangement is depen-
dent upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case, there
will always be an element of uncertainty associated with buy-sell
agreements and, in particular, the minimum pricing arrangements.
In the final analysis the ability of a minimum pricing arrangement
to control estate tax values depends upon the good judgment exer-
cised by the stockholders and their financial consultants and pro-
fessional advisors.129
2. Minimizing Income Taxes
The desirability of a minimum pricing arrangement in a buy-
sell agreement will become substantially greater if the carryover
basis provisions adopted in 1976 become permanent.13 0 The princi-
pal income tax effect of carryover basis is that transfers subse-
quent to death will no longer be entirely free of income tax liability
for appreciation occurring prior to death. This may not be a signifi-
cant factor for family corporations since family members receiving
stock with a carryover basis will not normally sell the stock within
the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, carryover basis would create
substantial additional taxes upon eventual disposition of the stock,
thereby as a practical matter making any transfer of the stock ill-
advised due to the tax burden.
More importantly for the family corporation, carryover basis
raises questions regarding the desirability of buy-sell agreements.
Under existing law,131 buy-sell agreements among family members
work very effectively because the stock transfer can take place at
death without payment of income taxes. This is particularly desir-
able where a corporate redemption is involved since the agree-
ment effectively provides a means for removing funds from the
corporation without adverse income tax consequences. 132 Carry-
over basis would add an income tax cost to such transactions
which must be weighed against the desirability of extracting
money from the corporation at capital gain rates.
If the income tax consequences of a buy-sell agreement are on-
erous, the stockholders might wish to have a buy-sell agreement
formula for estate tax valuation when the value determined by the formula
was zero).
129. If the parties are concerned that the agreement will not be binding for pur-
poses of estate tax valuation, they may wish to consider an agreement to re-
lease the estate of a deceased stockholder from the restrictive price.
Otherwise, the estate may be taxed on a high value but be required to sell at
a low value. Estate of Edward E. Dickinson, Jr., 63 T.C. 771 (1975), acq., 1977-2
C.B. 1.
130. See note 9 supra.
131. LR.C. § 1014(a) (step-up in basis).
132. See note 37 supra.
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primarily for the purpose of establishing reasonable estate tax val-
ues. Presumably, such an agreement would give an option to the
corporation or the surviving stockholders to purchase the dece-
dent's stock. Such an option, however, might never be exercised
because of the adverse income tax consequences. Obviously,
when entering into an option agreement the individuals involved
must have consistent objectives. An option arrangement with a
minimum price would be undesirable where one family member
might exercise rights under the buy-sell agreement thus burden-
ing other family members with the income tax.
The adverse income tax consequences anticipated under carry-
over basis have already prompted a search for alternatives to the
implementation of buy-sell agreements. One alternative would be
to transfer stock by gift or bequest rather than by sale or exchange
upon implementation of a buy-sell agreement. 133 Major difficulties
under this alternative are (1) funding the estate and the surviving
spouse' 4 and (2) transferring control stock to younger family
members. 135
Planning techniques relating to the financial needs of the estate
and the surviving spouse are considered, in part, elsewhere in this
paper. For example, the surviving spouse could be bequeathed
preferred stock which would provide her with an annual income. 13 6
Similarly, steps could be taken to insure that the estate will qualify
for deferred payment of estate taxes.137 In this manner, future
earnings of the corporation could be used by the surviving spouse
to pay death taxes. If the estate does not qualify for deferred pay-
ment of estate taxes, 138 it may wish to consider pledging company
stock for a loan to pay estate taxes. This alternative, however,
would be more expensive and the loan might not be available on a
long-term basis.
If the buy-sell agreement is funded with life insurance, the pro-
ceeds typically are used by the corporation or surviving stockhold-
ers to purchase stock held by the decedent at death. The
insurance proceeds are then used by the estate to pay estate taxes
and by the surviving spouse to provide for personal needs. Under
133. The Service takes the position that buy-sell agreements do not establish
value for gift tax purposes. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 244. However, the
courts have been willing to accord significant weight to restrictive agree-
ments for the purpose of establishing gift tax values. Lloyd D. McDonald, 3
T.C.M. (CCH) 274 (1944); Clarence P. Chamberlin, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 469 (1943).
Contra, Driver v. United States, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 76-6315 (W.D. Wis. 1976).
134. See text accompanying notes 136-45 infra.
135. See text accompanying notes 146-49 infra.
136. See § IV of text infra.
137. See § II of text supra.
138. LR.C. §§ 6166, 6166A.
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carryover basis, the better alternative may be to have the surviving
spouse named as the beneficiary of the insurance policy so that
she receives both the stock and the insurance proceeds.13 9 This
would provide the surviving spouse the necessary liquidity to pay
estate taxes and avoid income taxes which would otherwise be due
on disposition of the stock.14° Disadvantages of this alternative are
that the insurance proceeds might be includible in the decedent's
estate 14 1 and the estate of the surviving spouse is increased by any
remaining amount of insurance proceeds paid directly to her and
unspent at her death.142 It also may be more difficult to transfer
control of the corporation to children.
It seems reasonably clear that planning alternatives to imple-
mentation of buy-sell agreements will place a premium on man-
agement participation by the surviving spouse. Withdrawal of
corporate funds by a surviving spouse as a bona fide employee is
desirable because the corporation may deduct the payments as
salary thereby avoiding the double taxation inherent in dividend
payments. 14 3 Also, the payments would be subject to the fifty per-
cent maximum tax limitation on personal services income. 144 If es-
tate taxes are paid on the installment basis,145 employment
139. If possible the surviving spouse also should own the insurance policy. If the
decedent had no incidents of ownership in the policy, the insurance proceeds
will not be included in the estate. I.R.C. § 2042 (2). Caution should be exer-
cised, however, in transfers of existing policies. As a general rule death bene-
fits are not includible in gross income. I.RC. § 101(a) (1). However, where
there has been a transfer of the policy for consideration the exemption from
gross income rule becomes inapplicable and the proceeds are included in
gross income except to the extent of such consideration and the amount of
premiums paid after the transfer. LR.C. § 101(a) (2). Transfers resulting in a
carryover basis and transfers to the insured or the insured's partnership or
corporation are not subject to the transfer for value limitation. I.R.C.
§ 101(a) (2) (A)-(B).
140. In order to keep the insurance proceeds out of the decedent's estate, the sur-
viving spouse should not be obligated to pay taxes or other debts of the es-
tate. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(b) (1958).
141. Insurance proceeds are includible in the decedent's estate when the benefici-
ary is legally obligated to pay taxes and debts of the estate. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2042-1(b) (1) (1958). Whether the proceeds are includable when the ben-
eficiary is not legally obligated but does discharge obligations of the estate is
much more questionable. See Rev. Rul. 77-157, 1977-1 C.B. 279, holding pro-
ceeds received by a trustee with unexercised discretionary authority to use
trust funds to pay obligations were excludible under I.R.C. § 2039(c).
142. In addition, should the spouse be the first to die the value of the policy will be
included and taxed in her estate just like any other asset. Estate of Ethel M.
Donaldson, 31 T.C. 729 (1959).
143. LR.C. §§ 162, 301.
144. I.R.C. § 1348. Obviously the employment arrangement must be bona fide and
compensation must be reasonable and for services actually rendered. I.R.C.
§ 162(a) (1).
145. LR.C. §§ 6166, 6166A.
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compensation to the surviving spouse may provide a mechanism
for matching the timing of income and expense in contrast to in-
surance, which requires an initial outlay for premiums which is
nondeductible and often must be incurred many years prior to the
actual need for funds.
The transfer of control stock to younger generations should not
be significantly hindered by the alternative techniques to buy-sell
agreements. The controlling stockholder may wish to provide for
some transfers by direct bequest although such bequests would
reduce the amount of the marital deduction.146 Other planning
techniques which might be considered would be lifetime transfers
of stock to children either as gifts or for consideration. 147 Gifts
transfer future appreciation to younger generations, and apprais-
ers will discount the stock's value for gift tax purposes for minority
interests, 14 8 blockage, 14 9 costs of public distribution, 5 0 and other
value-reducing factors.
B. Payment Terms
Payment terms for a buy-sell agreement depend largely upon
the purchaser's ability to pay and the liquidity requirements of the
estate. Many times, however, it may be necessary for the agree-
ment to be structured to provide for installment payments of the
purchase price. If installment payments are contemplated after
carryover basis takes effect, the parties should insure that the con-
tract terms satisfy the requirements for installment reporting of
gain,15 particularly the requirement that no more than thirty per-
cent of the selling price be received in the year of sale.15 2 Install-
ment reporting will enable the seller to recognize gain
proportionately as payments on the purchase price are received.
This could result in a lower effective tax rate, especially if the stock
is distributed to a number of beneficiaries-for example, children
or trusts for their benefit-who are taxed at a lower tax rate on the
gain from its sale. It should be noted, however, that the transfer of
installment obligations obtained by an estate in the sale of stock
146. LR.C. § 2056(a).
147. Lifetime transfers may affect the availability of the installment payment
death tax redemption provisions. See text accompanying notes 13, 27 & 38
supra (outlining the ownership requirements applicable to I.R.C. §§ 6166,
6166A & 303).
148. E.g., Estate of Harry G. Stoddard, [1975] TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) 75-207.
149. E.g., Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F.2d 55 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 689
(1942).
150. See generally Maher, Discounts for Lack of Marketability for Closely Held
Business Interests, 54 TAxEs 562 (1976).
151. LR.C. § 453.
152. LR.C. § 453(b) (2).
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constitutes a disposition requiring the immediate recognition of
the full amount of gain inherent in the obligations.15 3 Thus, if in-
stallment payments will be received over an extended period,
consideration should be given to distributing the stock prior to sale
so payments can be reported by beneficiaries on an installment ba-
sis.
Another advantage of installment payment terms is that they
may be integrated with the installment elections for the payment
of estate taxes. The principal difficulty with integrating install-
ment elections and payments is the provision that disposition of a
substantial portion of the value of the closely held business will
cause the unpaid portion of the estate taxes to become due imme-
diately.15 4 It is unclear whether an installment contract for the
sale of the decedent's entire interest in a closely held business
constitutes a present disposition for purposes of the estate tax
payment installment election provisions. Since there is no author-
ity directly on point, it would seem best to provide for a series of
purchases of stock rather than for an immediate purchase of all of
the stock with a delivery of a promissory note. A series of sales
would probably be possible only with a cross purchase agreement,
since they would not satisfy the complete termination of interest
requirement under section 302.155
IV. PREFERRED STOCK ALTERNATIVES
The preferred stock recapitalization has become a favorite es-
tate planning technique. 56 In the recapitalization, common stock
typically is converted into both common and preferred stock This
can be accomplished without adverse income tax consequences.1 57
153. LR.C. § 453(d).
154. LR.C. §§ 6166(g) (1) (A), 6166A(h) (1) (A). See notes 23, 35 & accompanying
text supra.
155. In most closely held corporations, redemptions are unable to qualify for the
other two exceptions provided in LR.C. § 302. See § rn-A-1 of text supra. The
disposition problem would not arise in a section 303 redemption since such a
redemption does not reduce value if proceeds are used to pay estate taxes
within one year. See notes 23, 35 supra.
156. See generally Abbin, Gift Estate and Income Tax Exposure From Recapital-
izing Closely Held Companies, 10 U. ML m INsT. EsT. PLAN. ch. 12 (1976);
Dean, The Family Business: Organization and Reorganization, 5 U. MAIIA
INsT. EsT. PLAN. ch. 71-3 (1971); Ehrlich, Corporate Recapitalization as an Es-
tate Planning Business Retention Tool, 34 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1661 (1976);
Williams, Using a Recapitalization to Reallocate Equity Interests and Perpet-
uate Closely Held Status, 32 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 715 (1974).
157. In order to be taxfree the reorganization must qualify as a corporate reorgani-
zation under I.R.C. § 368(a) (1) (E) so that the nonrecognition provisions of
I.R.C. § 354 will apply. A business purpose must exist for the recapitalization.
Transfers of control in order to provide continuity in management constitute
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Thereafter the common stock is gifted to younger generations
while the parents continue to hold the preferred stock which pro-
vides a fixed income.158 The value of the preferred stock is deter-
mined by its voting rights, dividend rate and terms, and the rights
on liquidation.15 9 Gifting the common stock effectively transfers
future appreciation in the value of the corporation to the younger
generation and keeps it out of the estates of the donors. 60 For
these reasons preferred stock recapitalizations often occur at the
midpoint of an individual's business career. Preferred stock may,
however, be issued earlier or later and this portion of the paper
examines two such alternatives. First, preferred stock might be is-
sued on incorporation, thereby doing away with the need to recapi-
a valid business purpose. See Marjorie N. Dean, 10 T.C. 19 (1948), acq., 1949-1
C.B. 1; Elmer W. Hartzel, 40 B.T.A. 492 (1939), acq., 1939-2 C.B. 16. Continuity
of interest, however, is not a prerequisite of a recapitalization. Rev. Rul. 77-
415, 1977-2 C.B. 311; Rev. Rul. 77-479, 1977-2 C.B. 119. Thus, if the majority of
stockholders exchange all of their common stock in return for newly issued
preferred stock in a recapitalization constituting a reorganization within the
meaning of section 368(a) (1) (E), no gain will be recognized so long as the fair
market value of the preferred stock equals that of the common stock. Rev.
Rul. 74-269, 1974-1 C.B. 87.
158. A gift tax is levied upon transfers made for less than full consideration. I.R.C.
§ 2501. However, there is an annual exclusion for gifts of present interests of
$3,000 per donee. I.R.C. § 2503(b). Thus, a husband and wife could make joint
gifts of common stock worth $6,000 to each child without incurring a gift tax
liability. In addition, a single unified credit is allowed against gift tax liability.
LR.C. § 2505. The credit is $38,000 for gifts made in 1979, $42,500 for gifts made
in 1980 and $47,000 for gifts made after 1980. These credits may be claimed by
both husband and wife. However, the method of computing estate taxes pro-
vided in I.R.C. § 2001 has the effect of reducing the amount of the unified
credit against estate taxes provided in I.R.C. § 2010 by the amount of the uni-
fied credit against gift taxes which was used for life time transfers.
159. If the value of newly issued preferred stock is not equivalent to the value of
the common stock secured in exchange, the Service will argue that the differ-
ence constitutes a gift, compensation or some similar taxable transaction.
Rev. Rul. 74-269, 1974-1 C.B. 87. For example, assume a father and daughter
own all of the outstanding common stock in a corporation which is recapital-
ized with the father exchanging all of his common stock for preferred stock.
If the preferred stock which he receives has less value than the common
stock surrendered, the father has made a gift to his daughter since she re-
tains the common stock which represents the value of the corporation after
the preferred stock has been taken into account.
160. Certain lifetime transfers will be included in the estate of the donor. Prima-
rily such transfers are incomplete where the donor has retained rights with
respect to the property such as voting rights, a life estate, or the right to re-
voke or alter the gift. See I.R.C. §§ 2036,2037,2038 & 2041. Also included in the
donor's gross estate are all gifts, other than those for which the decedent was
not required to fie a gift tax return, made within three years of the date of
death. LR.C. § 2035. The gross estate is increased by the amount of any gift
taxes paid with respect to gifts within the three year period (LR.C. § 2035)
although a credit is allowed for gift taxes paid (LR.C. § 2012).
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talize later.161 Secondly, the corporation and its stockholders
might agree to recapitalize at some time in the future, thereby as-
suring a future shift in control and flow of income without pres-
ently affecting existing stockholders.162
A. Issuance of Preferred Stock on Incorporation
Whether preferred stock should be issued on incorporation is a
question seldom fully analyzed at the time of incorporation. If the
business is modest, few advantages can be gained by issuing pre-
ferred stock in addition to common; but if the business has sub-
stantial value, there are advantages to issuing preferred stock
immediately. First, the preferred stock does not run the risk of be-
ing treated as a stock dividend 163 and it is not considered section
306 stock.164 The business purpose test applicable to corporate re-
capitalizations is not relevant to preferred stock received on incor-
poration.165 If the stockholders incorporate pursuant to an estate
plan, they can immediately gift common stock to their children
while retaining the relatively fixed value preferred stock, thereby
shifting a greater amount of appreciation to their children than if
only common stock were issued. However, if the parents are not
immediately prepared to gift common stock to their children, the
issuance of preferred stock can result in serious disadvantages. If
the parents are relatively young and expect to retain the preferred
stock for a substantial period of time, the corporation may be faced
with the need to pay nondeductible dividends on the stock over a
prolonged period. Moreover, the common stock will appreciate in
value as the business appreciates in value, so that when the par-
ents decide to begin a gifting program they will be confronted with
161. See § IV A infra.
162. See § IV B infra.
163. I.l.C. § 305 provides that gross income does not include stock dividends.
There are, however, significant exceptions to the general rule which may give
rise to a deemed dividend distribution. An exception potentially applicable
to preferred stock recapitalizations occurs when some stockholders receive
preferred stock and others increase their interests in earnings and profits.
I.R.C. § 305(b) (3)-(c). However, the exception should not apply where the
recapitalization is an isolated transaction. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(e), exp. (12)
(1973). See Rev. Rul. 75-93, 1975-1 C.B. 101.
164. Section 306 stock is any stock, other than common stock, received as a non-
taxable stock dividend under section 305 when the corporation has earnings
and profits. Preferred stock issued in a preferred stock recapitalization is a
typical example of section 306 stock. The section 306 taint means that the sale
or disposition of the stock will be treated as a dividend rather than a sale or
exchange. The amount realized will be characterized as ordinary income to
the extent of the stock's pro rata share of earnings and profits at the time it
was issued.
165. See note 157 supra.
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the necessity of making larger gifts. 166 If the appreciation is sub-
stantial, a recapitalization of the company might be necessary in
order to allocate more of the value to the preferred stock.
An advantage to issuing preferred stock on incorporation is that
the terms of the preferred stock may be determined only by state
law without regard to the effect of such provisions on value that
must be considered with preferred stock recapitalizations. 167 For
example, the stockholders presumably have complete flexibility
with respect to dividend rates and whether dividends are
mandatory or cumulative. 68 This presents some intriguing plan-
ning alternatives including the possibility that the terms of the
preferred stock might change automatically over a period of time.
For example, the preferred stock could initially be voting and non-
cumulative with no intent to pay dividends. These terms could
shift eventually to non-voting with mandatory or cumulative divi-
dends. Presumably liquidation rights could also be altered. 6 9 Al-
though the Service has apparently never addressed the tax effect
of such shifting terms for stock interests, it would seem that the
lapse of certain rights or the maturation of other rights would not,
in and of themselves, constitute taxable transactions either for in-
come tax or gift tax purposes. 170 Thus, future appreciation could
be separated from control so that common stock could initially be
gifted without adversely affecting control; the control would shift
automatically at the time the preferred stock automatically lost its
voting rights. Similarly, appreciation in value could be shifted to
younger generations through gifts of common stock but the par-
ents could receive current benefits through compensation for serv-
ices rendered until the time they are willing to retire and shift
actual control to the younger generation. At that time the pre-
ferred stock would presumably begin paying dividends.
A principal disadvantage of issuing preferred stock on incorpo-
ration is that the preferred stock will undoubtedly constitute a sec-
ond class of stock, thereby precluding an election to be taxed
under subchapter S.171 This may be a significant disadvantage if
the corporation anticipates substantial business losses after incor-
166. See note 158 supra (discussion of the tax effect of making larger gifts).
167. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2014 to -2015 (Reissue 1977).
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., id. § 21-2015.
170. Gains and losses are not taken into account for tax purposes until realized as
a result of a definable transaction such as a sale or exchange or other disposi-
tion. Thus, mere increases and decreases in the value of preferred stock,
whether due to changing economic conditions or the terms of the stock,
should have no tax affect. See generally Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189
(1920).
171. LR.C. § 1371(a) (4).
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poration.172 The subchapter S election also has been recom-
mended as a timing device for midstream incorporations to insure
that the stockholders do not suffer an adverse allocation of income
and expense. 73
B. Agreement to Recapitalize in the Future
Implementation of a preferred stock recapitalization and gifting
program is a major step for most business people. Often the need
to recapitalize occurs long before the stockholders are willing to
commit themselves to either a transfer of control or a limitation on
their interest in the future appreciation in the value of the busi-
ness. One possible alternative in such circumstances is an agree-
ment to recapitalize at some time in the future.
The advantages of an agreement to recapitalize in the future
are that existing stockholders retain absolute control and full eq-
uity participation in the business while arrangements are made for
an orderly transfer of control and direction of future income. For
example, the agreement could provide for a preferred stock recapi-
talization upon the death of the majority stockholder. The purpose
of the recapitalization would be to provide both voting common
stock and nonvoting preferred stock with a reasonable dividend
rate which could be transferred to surviving family members. Indi-
viduals succeeding to the controlling stockholder's position in the
company would receive a majority interest in the voting common
stock. The preferred stock could be distributed according to the
decedent's wishes among the surviving spouse and children not
participating in the business. Thus, the participating child would
have control of the business while other members of the family
would be treated fairly through receipt of the preferred stock. The
advantage, of course, is that the child who will succeed to the con-
trolling stockholder's position in the corporation is assured of suc-
cession by the agreement. Even though it might not take place
until the successor is middle-aged, the guarantee of succession
enables the individual to commit his or her future to the corpora-
tion.
While such an agreement may provide for the orderly disposi-
tion of a controlling stockholder's interests in a family business,
the agreement does nothing to reduce or limit the value of the
172. Corporations may carry over net operating losses for seven years. LR.C.
§ 172(b) (1) (B). A subchapter S election permits stockholders to deduct their
pro rata share of the corporation's losses. I.R.C. § 1374. Thus, stockholders
may benefit from the immediate use of business losses if they have sufficient
ordinary income to offset the losses. See I. GRANT, SUBCAPR S TAXATION
§ 1.4 (1974).
173. Eastwood, supra note 3, at 466.
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gross estate. Furthermore, the agreement is subject to a degree of
uncertainty. The Service will not issue a private letter ruling with
respect to prospective transactions. 174 The recapitalization must
be tested under the law and facts existing at the time of its imple-
mentation rather than at the time the agreement was adopted. In
addition, it may be possible to abrogate the agreement in the fu-
ture, in which case it is merely a statement of intent.
V. EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS
Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs)175 have been re-
cently touted as a cure-all for the estate planning problems of
farmers and ranchers. 7 6 The premise of this suggestion is that the
ESOP can be used to transfer control to other family members
upon the death of the principal stockholder while the value of the
stock held by the ESOP is excluded from the decedent's estate. 77
ESOPs can result in favorable income, estate and gift tax bene-
fits to the employees of a corporation and to the corporation it-
self, 7 8 as well as providing a vehicle for estate planning for the
principal stockholder. 7 9 If the plan qualifies under section 401(a)
of the Code, the contributions a corporation makes to the ESOP
are deductible within the limits prescribed by section 404(a) (3).180
The ESOP trust receives either cash or company stock. If it re-
ceives cash it normally uses the cash to purchase company
stock.181 In either case, the corporation continues to have use of
the money and additional cash flow is created as a result of the
174. Rev. Proc. 72-9, 1972-1 C.B. 718.
175. For purposes of this discussion, an ESOP consists of an eligible individual
account plan (Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
§ 407(d) (3), 88 Stat. 880 (1974) (ERISA) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d) (3)
(1976))) which is qualified under I.R.C. § 401 and designed to invest primarily
in employer securities. See Ludwig & Curtis, Benefits of Employee Stock
Ownership Plans Affected Markedly By the 1978 Revenue Act, 50 J. TAX. 15
(1979) (discussion of other qualified plans which may also invest in employer
securities).
176. Kruse, No Reason to Pay Estate Taxes on Farmland, SuccEssFUL FARMING,
Sept. 1978, at 23.
177. Id.
178. See generally Callahan, Problems and/or Advantages in Using an Employee
Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) as a Buy-Out Arrangement, 35 N.Y.U. INST.
FED. TAx 713 (1977).
179. See generally Rock & Brooks, ESOP May Facilitate Tax-Free Transfer of In-
terest in Closely Held Corporations, 56 TAxEs 43 (1978).
180. In stock bonus plans the corporation can take a deduction for contributions of
up to 15% of the compensation of covered employees. I.R.C. § 404(a) (3) (A).
However, if the corporation also has a money purchase pension plan the de-
duction limit is raised to 25%. LR.C. § 404(a) (7).
181. ERISA §§ 407, 408(e), P.L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 1974-3 C.B. 49, 55, provide that
the acquisition of employer securities is not a prohibited transaction.
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allowable tax deduction. 182
An ESOP, like other qualified plans, results in favorable income
tax benefits to participating employees of the corporation. They
are not taxed on the value of the employer's annual contributions
to the plan.183 A further advantage is that the income which the
ESOP trust derives from the contributed assets is not currently
taxed.184 Rather, employees are taxed on property distributed to
them or their designated beneficiaries from the ESOP trust,
whether the distribution is at death, disability or retirement, or at
termination of employment.185 Cash distributions are taxed in full
but taxation of distributed employer securities is limited to the
value of the securities when they were contributed to the plan.186
Any unrealized appreciation is taxed upon disposition of the
stock.187
The ESOP may also result in estate planning benefits to the
principal stockholder and other employees of the corporation in ei-
ther of two ways. First, if after the participant's death the desig-
nated beneficiary takes a distribution from the plan in annuity
form, the value of the plan assets will not be included in the par-
ticipant's gross estate.188 Second, for estates of participants dying
after 1978, if the beneficiary of the plan is not the participant's es-
tate, and the beneficiary makes an irrevocable election to forego
income tax benefits available for lump sum distributions, 189 the
value of the lump sum distribution will not be included in the par-
ticipant's gross estate.190 Thus, the recipient must elect between
income tax advantages and exclusion of the value of the partici-
pant's plan assets from the gross estate. If the income tax advan-
tages are foregone, control of the corporation can be shifted to the
children of the deceased principal stockholder without the value of
the stock held in the ESOP trust and allocated to the decedent's
account being included in the gross estate. The principal stock-
holder may indirectly have control over voting the stock and ad-
ministration of the ESOP during lifetime through the
administrative committee so that the dilution effect of contributing
stock to a plan may not have any practical disadvantage to the
182. Knight, ESOPs Offer Employee Benefits, Corporate Financing and Contro
Estate Planning, 43 J. TAX. 258, 259-61 (1975).
183. I.R.C. § 402.
184. I.R.C. § 501(a).
185. I.R.C. § 402(a).
186. I.R.C. § 402(e) (4) (D) (ii).
187. LR.C. § 1001.
188. LR.C. § 2039(c).
189. I.R.C. §§ 402(a) (2) (capital gain treatment) & 402(e) (1) (C) (10-year averaging
treatment).
190. I.R.C. § 2039(c).
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principal stockholder or the corporation. 191
Designating children of the participant as beneficiaries of the
plan does not result in the imposition of a gift tax.192 Thus, stock
can be shifted at death to the principal stockholder's family mem-
bers without gift or estate tax consequences if the beneficiary
makes the proper election. 193 By designating a particular child as
the beneficiary, the control can be transferred to a child active in
the corporate business.
Another advantage of an ESOP results from the fact that under
certain circumstances the ESOP trust may purchase stock owned
by the major stockholder, thereby creating a market for the stock.
Gain from this purchase is taxed at capital gains rates without be-
ing subject to the restrictions imposed on stock redemptions under
section 302(b). The Service scrutinizes these transactions and has
issued Revenue Procedure 77-30194 which informs tax planners
when the Service will issue advance rulings on the tax effect of
such sales.195
A possible disadvantage of an ESOP in the family farm context
is the potential cost of having to grant plan benefits to unrelated
employees. The terms of the ESOP must be nondiscriminatory,
and the plan cannot be designed to favor officers, stockholders, or
highly paid employees of the corporation.196 Further, if the corpo-
ration employs seasonal employees, the plan may have to be made
available to them.197 However, if the employees of the corporation
191. See generally Knight, An Analysis of the Special Problems That Arise When
Employers Adopt ESOPs, 43 J. TAX. 328 (1975). The control over voting stock
is subject to fiduciary obligations that the stock must be voted exclusively for
the benefit of the plan participants.
192. I.R.C. § 2517.
193. Alternative computations should be made to determine whether the estate
tax or income tax advantages are more favorable.
194. 1977-2 C.B. 539.
195. Rev. Proc. 77-30, 1977-2 C.B. 539, requires that the selling stockholder and re-
lated persons must not possess more than 20% of the beneficial interests in
the plan. Revenue procedure 77-30 is merely a statement of the Service's po-
sition for advance ruling purposes. Whether the courts will treat a majority
stockholder's sale to an ESOP trust as a dividend is questionable, as is the
percentage ownership in excess of 20% at which the Service will challenge a
sale as a dividend distribution.
196. I.R.C. § 410(b). Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (3) (1960) and Rev. Rul. 71-263, 1971-1
C.B. 125, provide that all of the facts and circumstances will determine
whether there is a bona fide plan exclusively for the benefit of general em-
ployees. This requirement goes both to the terms of the plan and its opera-
tion. Thus, a plan which is valid according to its terms might fail to qualify if
in operation it discriminates in favor of highly compensated employees. See
also Furseth, Retroactive Cure of Employee Plan Defects: When, What and
How, 48 J. TAx. 220 (1978) (enumerating various operational defects and sug-
gesting possible cure techniques).
197. Rev. Rul. 73-283, 1973-2 C.B. 133. A plan may be able to exclude all employees
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consist solely of the husband and wife and their children, the fam-
ily may derive substantial estate, gift, and income tax benefits
from an ESOP without concern that the plan may be discrimina-
tory.
An ESOP may result in considerable annual administration ex-
p nse to the corporation adopting it. Because a qualified plan may
be disqualified through administration which does not comply with
applicable statutes, regulations or the plan documents, it is critical
that closely held corporations administer the ESOP in conjunction
with legal advice designed to avoid an inadvertent disqualifica-
tion.198 In addition, accurate records must be kept of the basis and
fair market value of stock being contributed and distributed from
the ESOP trust to allow an accurate determination of the tax con-
sequences of a distribution to participating employees. 199 An
ESOP presents the same administrative burdens as do other quali-
fied plans, with the additional requirement that the corporation be
appraised annually to determine the fair market value of the
stock.200 The stock must be valued annually to accurately deter-
mine the value of stock being contributed to or purchased by the
ESOP trust, the value at which it is distributed to participants and
the value for repurchases by the ESOP trust or corporation from
the beneficiary.201 If a farm or ranch corporation is involved, the
annual independent appraisal might be made by a local appraiser
familiar with local land costs, who computes the fair market value
of the corporation as a going concern.202 Other costs involved with
an ESOP are the expense of a trustee and legal and accounting
expenses. Since a modest family held corporation will not have
many employees, the reporting requirements can be streamlined,
and even if a professional administrative organization is retained
to administer the plan, the cost should not be unreasonably high.
It may be difficult, however, with a modest family corporation to
who are credited with less than 1000 hours of service during a plan year.
However, if a plan adopts this participation requirement, and the corporation
employs a significant number of seasonal employees, the plan may be at-
tacked by the Service as being discriminatory. Further, the Department of
Labor may make a similar claim, and may issue regulations at a later date
giving further guidance in such circumstances.
198. See Furseth, supra note 196.
199. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-l(b) (1960), amended, T.D. 6887, 1966 C.B. 129.
200. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11(d) (5) (1977).
201. Id.
202. Use of a local real estate appraiser is not without problems and uncertainties.
Normally appraisers consider many factors in addition to asset value such as
values determined under a capitalization of earnings method. The proper
treatment of the various factors for a farm or ranch corporation is a matter of
judgment. However, the single most important factor probably is the value of
the underlying real estate.
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transfer substantial amounts of stock into the trust in order to de-
rive income and estate tax benefits sufficient to justify the adminis-
trative expense of the plan. Under section 404(a) (3) (A),
contributions are deductible only to the extent of fifteen percent of
the compensation of participants in the plan.20 3 If, for example,
the corporation has a small number of employees whose total com-
pensation equals $200,000, the deductible contributions to the
ESOP would be limited to $30,000 in cash, stock or other property.
If the corporation is in the forty-six percent federal income tax
bracket, the tax savings resulting from contributing stock worth
$30,000 to the ESOP trust would be $13,800. This level of contribu-
tion and tax savings implies that the corporation is paying rela-
tively high salaries to its employees, while its taxable income
exceeds $100,000 per year. If the corporation does not have com-
pensation and taxable income of this magnitude, its income tax
benefits will be reduced accordingly.
It is unlikely that ESOPs can be used to replace traditional es-
tate planning techniques or even play a dominant role in the estate
plans of most farmers, ranchers or small businessmen. Since de-
ductible contributions are restricted to a percentage of employees
annual salaries, 2 04 a goal of diluting the percentage of ownership of
the majority stockholder may take many years.205 The problem is
compounded by inflation and the fact that the corporation may be
worth a substantial amount at the time that the ESOP is adopted.
If the corporation issues new stock to the ESOP, the total number
of shares outstanding increases, which diminishes the relative sig-
nificance of the amount of the stock held by the ESOP. However, if
the ESOP purchases stock from a majority stockholder, the total
number of shares will not increase but the purchase will result in
taxable income to the stockholder (although it may be at capital
gains rates).206
In short, an ESOP may be financially advantageous to a small
closel:y held business if expenses can be controlled satisfactorily.
If the corporation has no employees other than family members
203. LR.C. § 404(a) (3) (A). See note 180 supra.
204. LR.C. § 404(a) (3) (A).
205. Section 404(a) (3) (A) provides that excess contributions may be deducted in
future years subject to the 15% of compensation limit in any one year. The
statutory language suggests that a company may thus contribute a large
block of stock in one year and realize the deductions in subsequent years.
This could be a tremendous advantage since the applicable value for subse-
quent deduction presumably would be as of the time of contribution. Note,
however, that excess allocations to a participant's account may result in dis-
qualification of the plan. A suspense account may be effective to prevent dis-
qualification.
206. See Rev. Proc. 77-30, 1977-2 C.B. 539; note 195 supra.
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who are required to be allowed to participate in the plan, common
stock can effectively be transferred to the ESOP and then to the
succeeding generation while generating both income tax and es-
tate tax benefits.
VI. ROULETTE BUY-SELL AGREEMENTS
A roulette buy-sell agreement can be a fair and reasonable
method for stockholders of a closely held corporation to resolve
problems of abuse of minority stockholders and corporate dead-
lock.207 The basic concept of the roulette buy-sell agreement is
that any stockholder who is a party to the agreement may activate
the agreement and thereby force a purchase or sale of corporate
stock with one stockholder setting the price and the other stock-
holder electing to buy or sell. Typically the agreement provides
that a stockholder who is a party to the agreement may give notice
to the other stockholder that the agreement is activated. For ex-
ample, in a corporation with two equal stockholders, one stock-
holder would give notice to the other stockholder that the
agreement was activated.208 The notified stockholder would have a
reasonable period within which to determine the value of the cor-
poration's stock. At the conclusion of the notice period the stock-
holder receiving notice would advise the initiating stockholder of
the price at which stock subject to the agreement would be bought
and sold. Then, the stockholder activating the agreement must ei-
ther elect to purchase from or sell to the stockholder establishing
the price.
The attractiveness of a roulette buy-sell agreement is two-fold:
(1) it enables an individual with a non-controlling interest in a cor-
poration to either withdraw from the corporation or obtain control
207. Roulette buy-sell agreements survive under a variety of colloquial aliases in-
cluding "shotgun," "Russian," and "Mexican standoff." Unfortunately, the
colorful, albeit insensitive, nomenclature has not generated much legal analy-
sis of the agreements and there is a lack of judicial authority on their func-
tioning.
208. Roulette buy-sell agreements function best when there are only two stock-
holders or two defined groups of stockholders. See § VI-F of text infra. For
this reason and for purposes of clarity the discussion in this section assumes
that two stockholders own all of the outstanding voting stock. A roulette buy-
sell agreement probably is undesirable for a professional service corporation
other than a two person firm. In addition to the complexities of multi-person
agreements, most professionals prefer to have buy-sell agreements which
favor the continuing entity. Thus, their agreements typically specify the
terms upon which a person may leave the organization and it is unusual for
the agreements to provide a financial incentive for leaving. A roulette buy-
sell would not favor the institutional continuation in the same manner.
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if there is an irreconcilable dispute with other stockholders;20 9 and
(2) it may prevent the damage which might occur to a corporation
if a deadlock between stockholders continued for a substantial pe-
riod.210
The terms of a roulette buy-sell agreement can significantly al-
ter the model described above. Factors which should be consid-
ered include determining (1) which party is likely to give notice of
activation of the agreement and who, therefore, has the right to
elect to become a purchaser or seller; (2) whether the agreement
should encompass an entity purchase or a cross purchase; (3)
length of notice and waiting period; (4) pricing and payment terms;
(5) provisions for default; and (6) multi-stockholder problems.
A. Activation of the Agreement and the Buy-Sell Election
Notice of activation of the agreement always determines which
party has the election to purchase or sell.211 The election, how-
ever, may either remain with the party giving notice of activation
or shift to the party receiving notice. The only mandatory require-
ment for the agreement to work fairly and properly is that the
party having the election to buy or sell should not establish the
price.2 12 Thus, the stockholders should consider such things as
whether they might wish to activate the agreement and whether it
would be advantageous to be able to set the price or to be able to
make the election to be a purchaser or seller. If a stockholder an-
ticipates activating the agreement, he or she may wish to retain the
right, after giving notice, to elect to be a purchaser in order to be-
come sole owner of the business. On the other hand, if the stock-
holder anticipates that the other party will eventually succeed to
control, the right to specify the price of the stock may be more im-
portant. In this case, assuming that the stockholder anticipates
giving notice, the agreement could provide that the stockholder
giving notice and activating the agreement would also specify, at
the time of giving notice, the price per share. The other party
would then have the right to determine whether to be a purchaser
or seller pursuant to the terms specified by the party giving notice.
209. See generally 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 51, § 905. Typically the agreements re-
quire that all stock of a selling stockholder be purchased.
210. Id.
211. This is due to the fact that the sequence of events must be determined by the
agreement. Thus, once the agreement is activated, the parties can easily de-
termine their respective roles and responsibilities.
212. Fairness mandates that one party establish the price and the other choose to
buy or selL This basic legal maxim of fairness probably is sourced in
mother's kitchen where one child would divide a piece of cake and the other
would choose either piece. Obviously an attempt to be unfair in dividing the
cake resulted in a benefit to the other child if he or she chose wisely.
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The difficulty with the foregoing analysis is its highly specula-
tive nature. The stockholder must anticipate at the time the agree-
ment is drawn both who will be the party to activate the agreement
and the relative interests of the parties in being purchasers. These
are not only difficult subjective matters but the underlying facts
which shape the analysis may change. For example, the stock-
holder who apparently has an unquenchable thirst to control the
entire business might later tire of the business or otherwise be-
come less capable of purchasing the business.
A similar difficulty with roulette buy-sell agreements concerns
the relative abilities of the parties to exercise their rights under
the agreement. The parties may differ in their desire to have full
control of the business and such differences may be the major fac-
tor in determining the eventual outcome of the agreement. Differ-
ences in individual motivation, however, do not adversely affect
the fairness of roulette agreements although they may affect the
price established for the stock.213 Financial differences between
the parties, however, may affect their ability to take advantage of
rights under the agreement and may alter the fairness intended in
roulette buy-sell agreements. For example, if one stockholder is
obviously unable to accomplish the purchase the other stockholder
may be able to establish a bargain price for the stock. If the
financial abilities of the parties can be reasonably determined in
advance, it may be possible to partially control this type of disad-
vantage by providing that the stockholder giving notice activating
the agreement will not establish the price. Thus, the stockholder
with the greater financial resources could not both activate the
agreement and establish the purchase price. This method is not
entirely satisfactory, however, since the financially disadvantaged
stockholder must take finances into account when establishing a
price. If he establishes a price which is too high he may face the
prospect of having the other stockholder require a purchase of the
stock. In that event the financially disadvantaged stockholder may
find himself in breach of contract on his obligation to purchase.
Although it is difficult to anticipate possible damages, it seems
clear that a defaulting purchaser would be at a severe disadvan-
tage in litigation if he or she was financially unable to complete the
purchase and had designated the purchase price.2 14
213. Roulette buy-sell agreements obviously place pressure on the traditional no-
tion of fair market value as the price at which a willing buyer and a willing
seller will trade. Montrose Cemetery Co. v. Commissioner, 105 F.2d 238 (7th
Cir. 1939), affid per curiam, 309 U.S. 622 (1940). Individual differences obvi-
ously affect the purchase price.
214. See § VI-E of text infra.
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B. Entity or Cross Purchase
The concept of roulette buy-sell agreements contemplates
purchases by individual stockholders rather than 'corporate re-
demptions as the agreements involve personal stockholder deci-
sions and actions to activate the agreement and determine the
parties' rights. A purchase by the corporation, however, has the
advantage of using corporate funds without the income tax
problems inherent in transferring funds to purchasing stockhold-
ers.2 15 The risk of an entity purchase agreement is that the re-
maining stockholders may be deemed to have received dividend
income if the corporation discharges their personal obligations. 216
It should be possible to structure an entity purchase roulette
buy-sell agreement which minimizes dividend risks if the parties
are willing to substitute different business risks. If the agreement
specifically provides that the individual stockholders have no obli-
gation to make the purchase, no dividend income should result to
the remaining stockholder from the corporation's redemption of
the selling stockholder's interest.2 17 The agreement, however,
would have to completely eliminate any individual obligation to
purchase. The agreement would require both parties to cause the
corporation to make the redemption on the agreed terms. Finan-
cial support of the redemption by the remaining stockholder prob-
ably is possible although capital contributions and debt
guarantees further obscure whether the obligation to purchase is
personal or corporate-especially if a stockholder is required in
the buy-sell agreement to fund or guarantee the redemption. How-
ever, without mandatory funding obligations, the obligation of the
corporation to make the redemption may be unenforceable. 2 18
Thus, a stockholder not wishing to allow the other party to sell pur-
suant to the agreement might be able to set a price beyond the
capabilities of the corporation.
C. Length of Notice and Waiting Period
Buy-sell agreements are entirely voluntary and not subject to
215. See generally B. BrrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPO-
RATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ch. 7 (3d ed. 1971).
216. Rev. Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 42; Rev. Rul. 58-614, 1958-2 C.B. 920.
217. Rev. Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 42; Rev. Rul. 58-614, 1958-2 C.B. 920.
218. The right of a corporation to redeem stock generally is dependent upon its
retained earnings. Nebraska law provides that no redemption may be made
which would make the corporation insolvent or affect stockholders having
prior rights on dissolution. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2066 (Reissue 1977). Insol-
vency is either the inability to pay debts as they come due or an excess of
liabilities over assets at fair market value. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2002(15) (Re-
issue 1977).
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state law requirements. 219 Thus, there are no mandatory lengths
of time for notice or waiting period, and timing of its operation
should be detailed in the agreement. Adequate time should be al-
lowed for both determining price and financing purchase obliga-
tions. The length of time required depends upon the nature of the
business, the necessity of obtaining professional assistance in de-
termining value, and the anticipated difficulty of financing a
purchase.
A well drafted roulette buy-sell agreement normally provides
for a significant cooling-off period during which the parties can re-
solve those differences which resulted in activation of the agree-
ment. If possible, the cooling-off period should be prior to the time
at which the price is to be fixed. To encourage reconciliation, the
agreement should provide that the stockholder activating the
agreement may unilaterally withdraw notice of activation within a
specified period of time without the consent of the other stock-
holder. If the stockholder receiving notice of activation disagrees
with the withdrawal of notice, he or she can independently tender
notice. The agreement should also encourage resolution outside
its provisions by specifically authorizing agreements by the stock-
holders which may be substituted for the functioning of the buy-
sell agreement.
D. Pricing and Payment Terms
Pricing normally is not specifically covered by roulette buy-sell
agreements. Instead, the agreement specifies a procedure which
results in one stockholder having the right to set the price.220 Fair-
ness of price is controlled by uncertainty as to whether the stock-
holder setting the price will be a purchaser or seller. The parties
may wish, however, to establish a framework or formula within
which the price must be determined. The risk in such a provision
is that an unfair price may frustrate the intent of the parties and
effectively neutralize the agreement. If price is predetermined by
the agreement, fairness requires that the right to elect to buy or
sell be assigned to the stockholder receiving the notice. But, if the
price is unfair, no stockholder would give notice activating the
219. The agreements may constitute a stockholder voting agreement, especially if
the stockholders agree to cause the corporation to act. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-
2034 (Reissue 1977).
220. See text accompanying notes 211-14 supra. Typically the price is in dollars
per share. This avoids complicated formulas for the purchase price which
result if one stockholder sets a price for a block of stock. However, if the
stock is held equally by the two parties one price applicable to each other's
stock is feasible.
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agreement, since the unfairness probably would work to that
stockholder's disadvantage.
Payment terms should be set by the agreement. If no terms are
specified, any purchase under the agreement presumably must be
made in cash payable in full at closing. Even if the stockholders
could currently effect a purchase for cash, they should consider
circumstances, such as growth of the business, under which a de-
ferred payment agreement might be necessary or desirable.
If the parties wish to allow deferred payments as an alternative,
the agreement should specify circumstances under which deferred
payments may be elected by the purchaser. In no event should the
selling stockholder have the right to elect deferred payments.
Such rights would constitute constructive receipt of income with
the result that the seller would have to take the entire purchase
price into income in the year of sale even though most of the pro-
ceeds are received in future years.221
Deferred payment terms should be structured to satisfy the in-
stallment reporting requirements of the Code which require that
the seller receive no more than thirty percent of the selling price in
the year of sale.222 For entity purchase agreements it might be
possible to structure the purchase as a series of stock redemptions
which satisfy the substantially disproportionate requirements of
the Code.223 An advantage to a series of substantially dispropor-
tionate redemptions is that payment in the initial year is not re-
stricted to thirty percent of the selling price.
E. Default
Roulette buy-sell agreements usually do not contain default
provisions. Presumably if stockholders follow the terms of the
agreement, the price of the stock and the identity of the purchaser
will be determined and the purchase will take place. Unfortu-
nately, this will not always be the case and a default raises com-
plex problems of the appropriate remedy.
The problem of a defaulting purchaser usually will arise when
the purchasing stockholder fixes a price which is beyond his or her
financial capabilities and is required by the other stockholder to
make the purchase. The stockholders probably did not contem-
plate this possibility when entering into the agreement but if they
had considered whether the stockholder fixing the price had to
221. See generally Finnegan, Constructive Receipt of Income, 22 N.Y.U. INST. FED.
TAx. 367 (1964); Krane, Income of the Cash Basis Taxpayer: Tax Now or
Later?, 46 TAXEs 845 (1968).
222. I.C. § 453(b) (2) (B).
223. IR.C. § 302(b) (2).
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have financial ability to buy at that price they probably would have
rejected the notion since personal financial considerations do not
normally play a part in stock valuation. 2 4 Thus, no breach of con-
tract should occur merely because a stockholder fixes a price
greater than that which he or she can afford despite the fact that
his or her actions may appear to lack good faith.
A breach of contract does occur when a stockholder is desig-
nated as the purchaser and is unable to complete the purchase
since the stockholder had agreed to be a purchaser at the estab-
lished price. Failure to complete the purchase should constitute a
breach for which some form of equitable relief should be available.
The appropriate judicial remedy, however, is unclear. Specific per-
formance is not possible since the purchaser cannot discharge the
payment obligation. A monetary award probably is inadequate, es-
pecially if the selling stockholder has a minority interest which re-
alistically is not saleable to a third party.
Since the selling stockholder does not wish to purchase at the
established price and the purchasing stockholder cannot perform,
a reasonable solution may be a renegotiation of the purchase price.
Will a court set a different price for the stock if it finds the estab-
lished price unfair or unworkable? Even sitting in equity, the
court is unlikely to provide basic contract terms such as
price-especially where the reduced price would work to the ad-
vantage of the defaulting purchaser. If the court does set a new
price, it presumably could require that the putative seller have the
right to elect to buy or sell at the new price.
If the court is unwilling to fashion an equitable remedy, the
agreement may become worthless as a device for eliminating dead-
lock or securing the rights of a minority stockholder. For example,
a minority stockholder who activates the agreement and elects to
sell cannot recognize the value of his or her stock if the purchaser
defaults and the courts will not redefine the contract. The minority
stockholder is, in effect, stymied in the efforts to sell the stock for
which there may be no other market.
Since the appropriate judicial remedy is uncertain and the will-
ingness of the courts to act is in doubt, the agreement should at-
tempt to set forth the rights of the selling stockholder if the
purchaser defaults. One alternative would be to permit a different
party, the selling stockholder, to set a new price and allow the de-
faulting purchaser the right to elect to purchase or sell. In fixing
the price the selling stockholder would have the advantage of
knowing the defaulting purchaser's financial limitations, a reason-
able advantage considering the circumstances which gave rise to
224. See § IDI-B of text supra.
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the problem. If the same stockholder elects to purchase and again
defaults, the other stockholder would have the right to purchase at
the new price. 225
The default problem is less severe if the stockholder activating
the agreement also must set the purchase price. Such an agree-
ment could also require that the activating stockholder provide a
letter of credit in the amount of the purchase price for the other
party's stock. Thus, the stockholder receiving notice is assured
that the activating stockholder can perform and default should not
occur. An alternative remedy would be to provide in the agree-
ment for liquidated damages. If the stockholder activating the
agreement also sets the price, a forfeitable deposit could be re-
quired to insure the stockholder's good faith.
Another alternative the agreement might provide is that default
by the purchasing stockholder permits the selling stockholder the
option of purchasing from the defaulting stockholder a controlling
interest at a price established by the agreement. This would at
least resolve any deadlock and guarantee to a minority stockholder
that the buy-sell agreement cannot be negated without giving the
minority stockholder control of the corporation. A variation of this
alternative would be to subject the defaulting stockholder's stock
to a voting agreement giving control to the selling stockholder until
the purchaser can complete the purchase.
F. Multi-Stockholder Problems
Roulette buy-sell agreements work well when only two stock-
holders are involved.226 The rights and obligations of the parties
are determined with relative ease. The addition of even one addi-
tional stockholder to the agreement, however, creates considerable
complexity. If stockholders can be segregated into two groups, the
two stockholder agreements discussed above can be implemented.
Each group must, however, have a voting agreement or under-
standing which enables each group to function as one for purposes
of the roulette buy-sell agreement.
If segregation into two stockholder groups is not feasible, the
buy-sell agreement must address the functional complications
caused by additional stockholders. For example, if there are five
stockholders, should the four receiving notice from one stock-
holder that the agreement is activated be allowed to fix different
225. This would, of course, allow the financially stronger stockholder to force the
other stockholder to sell at his or her price and with specific information of
the other stockholder's financial weakness.
226. Roulette buy-sell agreements are particularly desirable where there is equal
ownership. In such situations neither has voting control. Thus, the roulette
buy-sell agreement provides an alternative to inherent stalemate.
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prices for the stock or should the stockholder giving notice be re-
quired to set the price so that all purchases and sales will be at the
same price? Under the latter, what happens if two stockholders
elect to sell and two elect to buy? Do the rights and obligations
extend to stock acquired as a result of the agreement? If so, how
can a stockholder know the extent of a purchase obligation before
the purchase election is made? Must the stockholder activating
the agreement be prepared to purchase all stock other than his
own in order to activate the agreement when the principal goal is
to disengage from the business? The very existence of such ques-
tions may make a roulette buy-sell agreement impractical for more
than two stockholders.
VII. INDEPENDENT BOARD OF DIRECTORS
A form of corporate deadlock occurs when several members of
a younger generation compete for control of the business and the
older generation is unwilling to choose a successor. This can be
particularly true when the candidates vying for control are mem-
bers of different family units such as the children of brothers and
sisters in control.227 The inability to select a successor chief execu-
tive officer can perpetuate control by the older generation and pre-
vent effective estate planning due to the inability to dispose of
control common stock.
The principal difficulty with resolving such a deadlock is that
close family loyalties block the decision making process. One
planning technique which neutralizes personal family considera-
tions is the election of an independent board of directors and the
employment of a chief executive officer who is not a family mem-
ber. Depending on numbers and individual preferences, both the
older generation and members of the younger generation inter-
ested in seeking control could be members of the board of direc-
227. A recent example of the difficulty in shifting corporate control to children of
brothers and sisters concerns the prestigious Ford Motor Co. Benson Ford,
Henry Ford I and William Clay Ford, were active as officers in Ford Motor
Co. and owned or controlled approximately 40% of the Class B voting stock.
Benson Ford, Sr., owned the second largest block of Class B voting stock and
was a director. Following his father's death in July, 1978, Benson Ford, Jr., at
age 29, sought his father's position on the board. Interestingly, Henry Ford
apparently is grooming his son, Edsel Ford II, age 30, for an executive role.
Although purely business considerations may govern Henry Ford's failure to
respond affirmatively to Benson Ford's request, it also is possible that he
does not want to aid someone who might compete with his son Edsel in fu-
ture years. Benson Ford's participation on the board of directors at such an
early age could give him a significant advantage over Edsel Ford II in any
future struggle for control among family members. See Newsweek, April 9,
1979, at 82, col. 1-2; Wall St. J., May 10, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
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tors together with outside directors. If and when older members
become unwilling or unable to serve on the board, their positions
could either be eliminated or transferred to additional outside di-
rectors. In other words, the company would continue to be family
owned but it would be run by outsiders including an independent
board of directors and an independent chief executive officer.
Those vying for control could be assigned principal responsibilities
within the company, each reporting directly to the chief executive
officer. At the end of a predetermined period, such as five years,
the outside directors could select a chief executive officer from
within the family based solely on merit. The plan could, for exam-
ple, be combined with a preferred stock recapitalization so that
only individuals active in the operation of the business would re-
ceive common stock. Common stock could be equally divided
among active members of the younger generation and a buy-sell
agreement could effectively prevent any one individual from ac-
quiring a greater interest than that held by the others. This assur-
ance that no one individual could obtain majority control helps to
insure the continued existence of an independent board of direc-
tors which would make corporate decisions based upon the gen-
eral corporate good and the best interests of the family group.
Employment of an unrelated chief executive officer and an in-
dependent board of directors is not without its own difficulties. Al-
though the method could be effectively used to neutralize the
personal anguish associated with the necessity of choosing among
members of the younger generation, it does not resolve long-term
control problems. With common stock evenly split among various
family members, family control as opposed to control by outside
directors could only be achieved through agreement of the parties.
If voting stock is equally split between three or more individuals, a
voting agreement may be imposed by the older generation to in-
sure that an independent board of directors protects all family in-
terests. 228 In other words, unless the corporation can afford
substantial stock redemptions, and individual stockholders will
agree to be redeemed, an independent board of directors may be-
come a permanent fixture. But, the protection for the minority
provided by an independent board of directors is even more impor-
tant when a family member is the chief executive officer.
VI. CONCLUSION
Control problems of family corporations are as unique as the
individuals who own and control them. Often traditional corporate
control devices are ineffective to achieve the control objectives in
228. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2034 (Reissue 1977).
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family corporations. Family buy-sell agreements may wish to em-
phasize minimum pricing. Roulette buy-sell agreements may be
desired to protect minority rights or resolve problems of deadlock.
The planning alternatives suggested in this article are merely a
few of the possibilities which might be considered for a particular
control situation. Each family control issue is different and re-
quires the sort of creative analysis which comes from a familiarity
with the various control alternatives and mechanisms.
